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In Defense of the Post-Partisan President: Toward the 
Boundary Between “Partisan” Advantage and  
“Political” Choice 
 
David C. Weiss*
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This Article examines what it means, if anything, to be “post-
partisan.” To that end it develops metrics of Executive Branch partisan-
ship, which it uses to move toward a distinction between typical “politi-
cal” action and decision making as compared to those actions taken or 
decision-making processes entered into for “partisan,” party-based ad-
vantage. It argues that while a clean distinction is problematically for-
malistic, an analysis of Executive Branch behavior allows points of com-
parison for the claim that certain administrations are more or less 
partisan than others. 
Relying on this framework, the Article discusses the administrations 
of George W. Bush and Barack Obama, arguing that the former was the 
most party-focused in at least a half-century. It then examines what the 
Obama Administration’s claims of being “post-partisan” actually mean 
and discusses the relevance for public policy, concluding that post-
partisanship is a more limited and pragmatic goal than true bipartisanship 
but that given the current American political landscape—characterized 
by parties that are more internally coherent and polarized from each 
other than at any time in generations—Obama’s vision of post-
partisanship, regardless of whether he has realized it, is a valuable addi-
tion to the dynamics of American politics and serves a legitimizing func-
tion for a number of administrative and constitutional law doctrines. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Barack Obama ran for and entered the presidency promising to em-
bark on what he positioned as a new, “post-partisan” project.1 The me-
dia, his supporters, and the opposition have seized on the phrase—post-
partisan—devoting extensive coverage to the idea of a post-partisan pres-
idency. To some commentators, on both the Right and the Left, the call 
for post-partisanship was the bold planting of a flag bearing the standard 
for a new way of doing business in Washington. For others, perhaps a 
larger number, the message of post-partisanship was the same old prom-
ise run up the well-worn rhetorical flagpole of campaign pandering.2
The debate over whether President Obama is realizing Executive 
Branch post-partisanship is ongoing among politicians, campaign opera-
tives, and members of both traditional and new media. Most recently, 
those arguing that Obama’s vision of post-partisanship has failed have 
seemed to tally more points in the debate.3 Claims of partisanship were 
particularly acute in the events surrounding the 2009 stimulus bill,4 Jus-
tice Sonia Sotomayor’s nomination and confirmation to the Supreme 
Court,5 and perhaps most dramatically, the bitterness of the later stages 
of the health care reform debate.6 Not surprisingly, there is vast dis-
 1. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Address at the Democratic Convention: The American Promise 
(Aug. 28, 2008); Barack Obama, Address at the Council for Faith-Based and Neighborhood Partner-
ships (July 1, 2008); Barack Obama, Address at Labor Day Rally (Sept. 3, 2007). The full text of 
many of President Obama’s speeches is available at http://www.obamaspeeches.com. Though I am 
unaware of a speech in which Obama used the phrase “post-partisan” to describe himself, his high-
level advisors (and the media) clearly did. See Bob Secter & John McCormick, Obama in Chicago: 
Portrait of a Pragmatist, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 2007; Alec MacGillis, Does Obama’s Message Match 
the Moment?, WASH. POST., Oct. 17, 2007, at A1; Al From, Keeping the Promise of Post-
Partisanship, POLITICO, Nov. 12, 2008; Jonathan Rauch, Post-Partisanship, THE ATLANTIC ONLINE, 
July/August 2008, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200807/partisanship-rauch (last vis-
ited Jan. 27, 2010). 
 2. Before Obama, Richard Nixon had promised to “bring us together.” Gerald Ford pledged 
an era of “compromise, conciliation and cooperation.” George H.W. Bush was supposedly “kinder 
and gentler,” Bill Clinton led with a vision of a “third way,” and George W. Bush stated his desire to 
“change the tone.” See JOHN F. HARRIS, THE SURVIVOR: BILL CLINTON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 114, 
236, 302 (2005); Mara Liasson, Obama Seeks to Bridge Partisan Divide, NPR, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99536775 (last visited June 23, 2009) (inter-
viewing Norman Ornstein). 
 3. See, e.g., Linda Feldmann, Was Obama’s Promise of a Post-Partisan Era Ever Possible?, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 8, 2009; Jonathan Weisman, Post-Partisan Promise Fizzles, WALL. 
ST. J., Aug. 19, 2009, at A4. 
 4. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat 115 
(2009). 
 5. See Amy Goldstein & Robert Barnes, Senate Committee Endorses Sotomayor, WASH. 
POST, July 29, 2009 (describing the party-line vote over Sotomayor’s nomination in the Judiciary 
Committee). 
 6. See Meredith Shiner, House GOP: Obama “Most Partisan”, POLITICO, Jan 20., 2010 
(discussing healthcare reform and quoting Congresswoman Candice Miller, Republican of Michigan, 
as saying “you could argue [Obama is] the most partisan president that America has ever seen”). See 
also David E. Sanger, Big Win for Obama, but at What Cost?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at A1 
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agreement about whether the Obama Administration has worked to usher 
in an era of post-partisanship, or if instead the post-partisan promise was 
the paradigmatic naiveté to be expected from a politician with less than a 
full Senate term under his belt. 
But before we decide the extent to which President Obama has real-
ized his post-partisanship, we must ask what does it even mean to be 
post-partisan? So far, the debate has existed mostly in the realm of op-ed 
rhetoric, anecdotal example, and television sound bite. There is no legal 
framework or policy approach for examining what a post-partisan ad-
ministration might look like. Attempting to parse a difference between 
actions and decision-making processes that are either political or partisan 
can break down quickly. For example, to many progressive detractors the 
Bush Administration was intensely “partisan,” but the same critics often 
explained how it differed from typical presidential politics through emo-
tional appeals rather than arguments situated in a legal and policy 
framework.7 As currently constructed, the debate over post-partisanship 
could easily—and unfortunately—continue unchanged with both sides 
merely talking past each other. 
Distinguishing the partisan from the merely political is challenging, 
and doing so without falling into rightly rejected formalistic categories is 
even more so. As I use and explain the terms throughout this Article, the 
concepts fall on a continuum with “partisan” denoting Executive Branch 
action or decision making engaged in purely for cynical party advan-
tage—for example, relating to election outcomes, voting rules, or fund-
raising. On the other hand, “political” describes a much larger part of the 
continuum that encompasses Executive Branch actions or decisions made 
based on policy or ideological difference. Because of the closed-door na-
ture of Executive Branch decision making it is undoubtedly difficult to 
determine if the President has made a decision based on his particular 
ideology or specifically for Democratic or Republican electoral advan-
tage. In other words, while it is rhetorically easy to call an administration 
more or less partisan, creating the policy arguments and legal framework 
for such a claim is substantially more complex. No less an authority than 
the Supreme Court has cautioned that “inquiry into the mental processes 
of administrative decision makers is usually to be avoided.”8 The same 
(“[T]here is no doubt that in the course of [the health care] debate, Mr. Obama has lost something — 
and lost it for good. Gone is the promise on which he rode to victory less than a year and a half ago 
— the promise of a “postpartisan” Washington in which rationality and calm discourse replaced par-
tisan bickering.”). 
 7. For such an attack see DAVID CORN, THE LIES OF GEORGE W. BUSH: MASTERING THE 
POLITICS OF DECEPTION 150–53 (2003). See also The Frat Boy Ships Out, ECONOMIST, Jan. 15, 
2009. But see Richard M. Skinner, George W. Bush and the Partisan Presidency, 123 POL. SCI. Q. 
605 (2008) (providing the most detailed study of the Bush Administration as partisan). 
 8. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971). 
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could easily be said about ex post analysis of White House decision mak-
ing. Yet ignoring the practical difference between reasons for Executive 
Branch action is to allow theory to lag behind reality, a result we should 
seek to avoid.9 Some decisions are made for party advantage, some for 
policy goals, and, critically, many for mixed motives; discerning lines—
even rough lines—between these motivations is the challenge and goal of 
this Article. 
To some, such a distinction may be impossible. During the 2006 and 
2007 U.S. attorneys removal controversy, for example, Attorney General 
(AG) Alberto Gonzales’ Chief of Staff, Kyle Sampson, suggested to 
Congress that it was unrealistic to unpack a distinction between partisan 
politics and less nefarious political forms of decision making.10 Parsing 
the partisan from the political may remind some readers of the Progres-
sive’s now-quaint notions of administration as “science.”11 The failure to 
distinguish the meaning of the two terms and the two concepts, however, 
has not occurred because such analysis is impossible or is a formalistic 
dead end. Instead, it is because policy makers, political thinkers, and 
commentators have neglected to sufficiently problematize the distinction 
and analyze the difference inherent in the terms and embodied in the 
concepts of “political” and “partisan.” This neglect has led to a further 
failure to explore what implications the distinction has for many issues 
facing modern American law and government: arguments regarding the 
proper role and unitariness of the executive; claims in both directions re-
garding “new” and “excessive” partisanship in Congress; assertions 
about the recently “politicized” judicial nomination process; discussion 
of the role of politics and partisanship in Executive Branch agencies that 
have historic norms of independence; and challenges to the proper defer-
ence—Chevron12 or otherwise—that courts allow the Executive Branch. 
In this Article, I argue that it is both possible and important to distin-
guish types of Executive Branch behavior and decision making that are 
made based on partisan advantage, as opposed to those based on political 
choice. Beginning to sketch the difference between political and partisan 
behavior is one step toward a better understanding of the basic features 
of the American political and legal systems from a party-conscious per-
spective. Toward this end, the Article surveys commentators’ concerns 
with settings and procedures that are particularly vulnerable to excessive 
 9. For an important article making the general claim that legal commentators should seek to 
reconcile academic discourse and theory with practical political reality, see Daryl J. Levinson & Ri-
chard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 10. See Prosecutorial Independence: Is The Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring 
and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?—Part III: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. (Mar. 29, 2007) (testimony of D. Kyle Sampson, former Chief of Staff to the Att’y Gen.). 
 11. E.g., SAMUEL HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY 265–66 (1959). 
 12. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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partisanship as well as the injection of such party-based behaviors into 
those spaces by presidential administrations over the previous half-
century. It uses this survey to claim that though a distinction is difficult, 
and although there may be many cases that present analytically impene-
trable mixed motives, the typical areas of concern and questionable ac-
tion can be grouped into five metrics of partisanship,13 revealing behav-
ior or decision making grounded in party-based advantage. The five 
metrics I develop are as follows: first, the amount of emphasis placed on 
expertise in Executive Branch process; second, the level of specificity 
and accountability of political involvement in policy choices; third, per-
sonnel management; fourth, actions and decision making related to elec-
tion policies; and fifth, relationship building. While it would almost cer-
tainly devolve into formalism to simply check off whether an 
administration has acted politically or in a partisan manner for each met-
ric, they allow points of comparison, enabling the description of one ad-
ministration as seeming more or less partisan in relation to others. This 
Article also asserts that these metrics can provide leverage on thinking 
about what it means for a President to be “post-partisan,” arguing for a 
conception of post-partisanship that is more optimistic than those skepti-
cally viewing such claims as naive, but also developing post-partisanship 
as a more limited goal than do Pollyannas who claim that President 
Obama has found an entirely new brand of presidential politics. 
Part I notes the often-debated boundary between law and politics, be-
fore turning to the core of the discussion, the distinction between “politi-
cal” and “partisan” action and decision making. It sketches metrics of 
partisan action and decision making relying on criticism of excessive 
presidential partisanship from Richard Nixon through Bill Clinton. Part 
II applies this framework to the Bush Administration and the Obama 
White House and argues that the former exhibited a degree of partisan 
action and decision making not seen in recent presidencies, a trend from 
which President Obama has so far retreated. Part III then defines what it 
means to be “post-partisan” and explores normative implications of a 
post-partisan presidency. It argues that post-partisanship is a more lim-
ited philosophy than traditional bipartisanship but that such a develop-
ment is well-suited for the current political climate, which is character-
ized by atypically divided parties that are each more ideologically 
coherent than at almost any time in American history. Finally, Part III 
concludes by discussing the implications of post-partisanship for separa-
tion of powers and executive power doctrines in constitutional law as 
well as judicial deference to the Executive Branch in administrative law. 
 13. The same analysis undertaken in a more political setting would likely be termed a “Parti-
san Checklist,” “The Whip List,” or perhaps the “Partisan Pentathlon,” but for my purposes here, 
metrics of partisanship seems appropriate. 
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I.  LAW AND POLICY, POLITICAL CHOICE, AND PARTISAN ADVANTAGE 
 
Legal and political science commentators have spent decades debat-
ing the distinction—or lack thereof—between law and politics, but the 
difference between political choices and decisions made for partisan ad-
vantage is conceptually distinct.14 In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice 
Marshall explored the difference between “discretionary” and “non-
discretionary” acts—politics and law—explaining that discretion in-
volved cases that “can never be examinable by the courts” because there 
is no law to apply.15 Later, an increasing awareness of the influence of 
politics on the law began with the growth of legal realism, with its slogan 
“law is politics,”16 and continued as insights were gleaned from public 
choice theory. Yet the problem for Justice Marshall, and later the Wil-
sonians, and then the Realists—distinguishing between legal authority 
and political discretion—is not the same as differentiating between “po-
litical” and “partisan” decisions. Much closer to the issue of the politi-
cal/partisan divide was the Supreme Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore.17 
There, many progressives felt that the Court was acting with a different 
type of political motivation than justices typically bring to a case. Poli-
tics, a framework for understanding ideological values, had become par-
tisan politics, a medium through which to ensure crass electoral advan-
tage without further ends. 
 
A.  The Boundary Between Law and Politics 
 
This Section describes the history of the debate between “law” and 
“politics.” Commentators’ efforts to explain the difference, if one exists, 
between “law” and “politics” illustrates one end of a spectrum that po-
tentially runs from purely legal action on one end, through all shades of 
political action, to purely partisan action on the other. The law/politics 
debate also provides lessons on how one should approach an effort to 
 14. This Article uses the terms “law” and “policy” interchangeably since the core of the dis-
cussion here is related to acting politically versus acting in a partisan manner. I recognize, however, 
that “law” and “policy,” in other contexts, can have quite different meanings. As Elena Kagan has 
noted there is a sub-distinction among the law/politics distinction depending on whether one is using 
“law” to describe the bringing of a particular enforcement action, which is truly legal authority, or 
using the term “law” to describe a more broad type of neutral decision making that one might typi-
cally equate with the term “policy.” See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 2245, 2357–58 (2001). For the purposes of this Article the distinction is not critical because the 
focus is on parsing those decisions and actions that are political from those that are partisan. 
 15. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). 
 16. Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial 
Selections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (1988). 
 17. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
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distinguish the “political” from the “partisan,” providing a warning of the 
analytical risks of slipping into formalism. 
The history of the discussion surrounding the law/politics distinction 
is lengthier than can be recounted in this Article, but insights from those 
debates are useful to the political/partisan distinction that I develop be-
low. After the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798, which made it a 
crime to make false and malicious statements against President Adams or 
Congress—but not Vice President Jefferson, Adams’ likely opponent in 
1800—there were, not surprisingly, politically motivated prosecutions of 
newspapers supporting Jefferson.18 This was one of the first of many cri-
ses for the somewhat blurry distinction between law and politics. Com-
ing on the heels of this controversy, Chief Justice Marshall used Marbury 
to explain that politics was about discretion and that discretion was “the 
liberty to decide between alternatives.”19 Around the turn of the twenti-
eth century, the Progressives advanced a related distinction to describe 
the “science” of administration. Woodrow Wilson famously wrote that 
“administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics.”20 Later, the 
Administrative Procedure Act required procedures for agency action “in 
virtual isolation from electoral politics.”21 In his renowned Youngstown 
concurrence, Justice Jackson recognized a distinction between the Presi-
dent’s role as leader of a distinct “legal system” and a “political sys-
tem.”22 More recently, Jerry Mashaw has articulated what is now the 
classic formulation of the difference between law and politics: a distinc-
tion that treats law as “a system of objective and accessible commands” 
formed through “collective agreement” of policymakers as compared to 
politics, which is embodied by “the exercise of discretion or preference 
by those persons who happen to be in positions of authority.”23 Though 
commentators still disagree about the precise parameters of the distinc-
tion, Mashaw captures its core. 
Commentators also differ on the tenability of the law/politics distinc-
tion. Legal realists, public choice theorists, and others have thus chal-
lenged the viability of the classic formulation of the law/politics distinc-
 18. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S DARLING PRIVILEGE” 66–79 
(2000). For the classic account of the Sedition Act, see JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM’S 
FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956). 
 19. Marshall E. Dimock, The Role of Discretion in Modern Administration, in THE 
FRONTIERS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 46 (John M. Gaus et al. eds., 1936). 
 20. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration (1887), reprinted in CLASSICS OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 10, 10 (Jay M. Shafritz & Albert C. Hyde eds., 1978). 
 21. B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS 6 (1994). 
 22. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). 
 23. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Deci-
sions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 86 (1985) (though Mashaw does not himself support this “familiar” 
position). 
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tion, often by criticizing a literal reading of the Progressive view of ad-
ministration, which believed in the possibility of administration free from 
political considerations.24 Other commentators, however, view the dis-
tinction as one that still does analytical work, even if not as much as ear-
lier generations had claimed. In general, realism rejected formalism’s 
rigid categories and belief in genuinely neutral decision making as “tran-
scendental nonsense,” claiming that administrative decision making 
could not occur in an environment devoid of political choices.25 Yet, the 
rejection of the Progressive assertions does not mean there is no distinc-
tion between law and politics. According to Peter Strauss, for example, 
“Scholars and courts writing about the exercise of executive authority of-
ten seem careless about the relationship between political and legal au-
thority, but one can see that its dimensions are hardly trivial.”26 Strauss 
has argued that George W. Bush’s use of signing statements “has again 
crossed the line that divides the realm of law from that of politics, that 
divides oversight from decision (and policymaking).”27 Professor H.W. 
Perry has explained that “[w]ords such as ‘political,’ ‘bargaining,’ and 
‘strategy’ need not connote smoke-filled back rooms and shady deals. 
Politics, after all, only means that values are being authoritatively allo-
cated.”28 Finally, even for the many commentators skeptical that any 
form of decision making can be free from politics, neutral decision mak-
ing is often at least important to discuss as a normative aspiration for 
administration.29 This demonstrates that even the skeptical commentators 
recognize that administration can be infused with varying degrees of pol-
itics and that for some decisions less politics is better.30 As such, a con-
ception of “law” as a neutral form of decision making is still relevant to a 
 24. See, e.g., WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2000); Allan C. Hutchinson, Democracy and Determinancy: An Essay on Legal 
Interpretation, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 541, 547 (1989); Book Note, Democracy and Dishonesty, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 792, 796–97 (1993) (reviewing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, THE INTELLIGIBLE 
CONSTITUTION 19 (1992)). 
 25. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 
(1935). 
 26. Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, Or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 702 (2006) (citing Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary 
Executive During the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1537 (1997), as an exam-
ple of such carelessness). 
 27. Strauss, supra note 25, at 737 (also making the same law/politics distinction regarding 
Executive Order 13,422, which centralized White House control over agency decision making). 
 28. H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT 141 (1991). Economist David Brooks recently tried to set up a type of policy-
politics distinction using the terms “legislative pragmatism — writing bills that can pass” and “pol-
icy pragmatism — creating programs that work.” Op-Ed, David Brooks, Vince Lombardi Politics, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A21. 
 29. E.g., Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 
1413, 1413 n.347 (1995). 
 30. See id. 
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debate comparing those terms to “politics.” 
Regardless of whether one believes in “law” as potentially neutral, 
the term I use in this Article, “political choice,” is similar to Mashaw’s 
description in conceptualizing an Executive Branch officer’s discretion 
to approach a policy choice informed by personal or ideological policy 
preferences, or even the favoring of traditionally aligned interest groups. 
There may certainly be occasions when interest group consideration 
crosses a boundary into partisan politics, but, as discussed below, these 
are the difficult issues that must be teased out. Skeptical commentators 
would say that all administrative and Executive Branch decisions are po-
litical. Mark Tushnet, for example, has described the law/politics distinc-
tion by describing courts and legal institutions as retrospective and po-
litical institutions as prospective.31 Conceding the strongest realist 
claims, however, is not problematic for this Article because it examines 
only the subset of prospective decisions, seeking to break out partisan 
political decision making from the larger set of political decisions. 
 
B.  The Boundary Between Politics and Partisanship 
 
If—as Professor Strauss argued—decision is policymaking, and—as 
Chief Justice Marshall explained—discretion is politics, differentiating 
partisan politics from the larger set of political decisions and actions is 
another way of claiming that all uses of discretion are not equal. The goal 
in creating metrics to measure and distinguish a subset of partisan behav-
ior is not simply to create formalist boxes that realism properly rejected. 
It is precisely the opposite. The insight in discussing partisan behavior is 
that party and electoral advantage are pervasive, and—rather than being 
able to be excluded from decision making—factional gain can sometimes 
be the sole driver of modern, Executive Branch decision-making proc-
esses. The differentiation is also part of an effort to systemize a feeling 
that many political observers—professional and casual—have experi-
enced. In other words, many political commentators can tell when some-
thing is being done for simple ideological disagreement as opposed to 
cynical, party-based motives. However, such an experiential observation, 
while helpful, is not as robust as the type of policy and legal framework 
that I begin to develop in this Article. To this end, the following section 
describes the difference between partisan and political behavior and de-
cision making and explores environments and situations in which the Su-
preme Court and commentators have discussed—even in passing—the 
distinction. 
 
 31. See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS STRONG RIGHTS 84 (2009). 
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1.  Differentiating between partisan and political behavior 
 
The reason to distinguish between partisan and political actions and 
decisions is that there are a number of normative concerns with purely 
party-based action. I explore these problems with pure partisanship in de-
tail below.32 For now, however, it is sufficient to point out that acts taken 
for purely electoral purposes, serving no larger ideological end, under-
mine a number of doctrines in both constitutional and administrative law 
as well as traditional good governance values. First, partisan behavior 
subverts the accountability justification of executive power. Public ac-
countability, characterized in part by openness in decision making and 
procedural regularity, is a primary justification for broad executive pow-
er.33 To the extent that partisan behaviors undermine public accountabil-
ity,34 the rationale for executive power is weakened as well. Second, 
purely partisan behavior implicates practical separation of powers con-
cerns, particularly a modern separation of powers view that includes an 
account of whether government is party-unified or party-divided between 
Congress and the White House.35 Modern government structure relies as 
much on parties as branches to check government actors, and if the Ex-
ecutive Branch takes purposeful action to weaken this check it affects the 
structural restraints that the Framers intended.36 Third, judicial deference 
to Executive Branch decision making is also called into question if the 
Executive is making administrative decisions for purely party-based rea-
sons. Both commentators who view deference from the perspective of 
democratic values,37 as well as those who question deference when ex-
pertise is subverted for political purposes,38 would have reason to ques-
tion the proper scope of judicial deference when the White House injects 
party considerations into administrative decision making.39 Indeed, as I 
 32. See discussion infra Section III.B.2. 
 33. See Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. 
L. REV. 23, 35–37, 45, 65–66 (1995) (justifying normative claims for a unitary executive on the ben-
efits of increased accountability). 
 34. It is also not difficult to see how increasing opacity of government operations limits the 
ability of the electoral component of accountability to function properly as it becomes more difficult 
for the public to acquire the information to make decisions. In addition, to the extent that the White 
House can shift blame from itself to purportedly expert agencies while, in fact, overriding expert 
advice with White House appointees, the possibility of subverting accountability is even greater. 
 35. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 17. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id.; see, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
763, 780 (2006). 
 38.  Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 
2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 52 (2007). 
 39. Though not focusing on specifically party-based White House involvement, one interest-
ing article has advocated courts’ increased use of arbitrary and capricious review in agency decision 
making when the White House injects itself into administrative decision making. See Daniel P. 
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explore below, in the later years of the Bush Administration the Supreme 
Court became less deferential to administrative decision making when 
the White House’s explanations for its involvement seemed like pretext 
for more party-based motivations.40 Finally, even those commentators 
who have questioned the tenability of a form of administration absent po-
litical considerations have recognized that administrative decision mak-
ing can involve more or less weight given to politics.41 They further con-
cede that it is a widely-accepted normative value that in regard to many 
decisions and regulations a degree of technocratic expertise is desirable, 
particularly if the White House characterizes a decision as being made on 
the basis of science or expertise.42 Thus, party-based considerations, 
which are likely even more damaging than ideological considerations, 
move administrative decision making farther from this good governance 
ideal. It is for these reasons that it is important to think about the problem 
of partisanship and to try to differentiate purely partisan from more 
broadly political actions and decision-making processes. 
The Section that follows addresses the predicate issues to the norma-
tive discussion that I touched on just now and to which I will return in 
more detail in Part III. The Section first explains that partisan behaviors 
can be seen in both decision-making processes (means) and policy goals 
(ends) and that this distinction can be important for the discussion of par-
tisanship. Then, it explores the historical records, Supreme Court state-
ments, and academic commentators’ views on the tenability of a distinc-
tion between political choice and partisan advantage, demonstrating that 
such a distinction has existed since the Founding and is still relevant in a 
number of modern legal doctrines. 
a.  Means and ends in the political/partisan distinction. If politics 
and political choice is the type of discretion embodied in the majority of 
Executive Branch operations—as opposed to rarer pure partisan actions 
and decision making effected only for party advantage—an important, 
predicate explanation is that purely partisan behaviors can occur both in 
terms of ends or in terms of means,43 a distinction that could also be 
loosely understood in terms of substance and process. Without access to 
a decision-maker’s state of mind, however, means often serve as the best 
indication of motivation. Means are often the only practical method of 
detecting partisan pretext in ex post justifications for a decision. 
The ends-means distinction can be explained as follows: There are 
Rathbun, Note, Irrelevant Oversight: “Presidential Administration” from the Standpoint of Arbi-
trary and Capricious Review, 107 MICH. L. REV. 643, 663-73 (2009). 
 40. See infra notes 270–272 and accompanying text. 
 41. See, e.g., Idleman, supra note 30. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Thanks to Brad Moore for raising this point. 
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particular Executive Branch decision-making processes in which we may 
find strident partisanship. Decision-making mechanisms that seek to 
limit expertise, improperly inject political appointees, or purposefully 
advantage a particular party instead of an ideology, can often be charac-
terized as more partisan than political from the perspective of means. 
DOJ hiring practices during the Bush Administration that considered 
party affiliation in violation of the Hatch Act is an example of such 
means-based partisanship, detectable after-the-fact regardless of the pur-
pose for which it was done (its ends).44
There are also decisions and actions, however, that, even if under-
taken in a procedurally neutral way, may have partisan ends. In other 
words, these policies are those that the Executive Branch designs purely 
to benefit one party over another, not only in the sense of advancing a 
party’s political ideology—which could be seen as a case of mixed po-
litical and partisan motives—but in the sense of direct electoral advan-
tage.45 Actions taken for the purpose of influencing a prosecution for 
partisan gain can be characterized as having a uniquely partisan character 
in their ends. Former AG Gonzales, for example, conceded that it would 
have been “improper” had he fired a U.S. attorney to “interfere with or 
influence a particular prosecution for partisan political gain.”46
Author Ronald Brownstein has highlighted this means and ends issue 
in discussing partisanship and the “paradox” of the Nixon Administra-
tion.47 Nixon, Brownstein writes, “pursued (mostly) conciliatory ends 
with (almost invariably) divisive means.”48 Nixon recognized that “he 
had been elected in part because he had promised to heal the divisions” 
in the country, and he supported Democratic-sponsored legislation on the 
Voting Rights Act, the end of the draft, and many environmental stat-
utes.49 But, on the other hand, “[a]s a matter of both personal instinct and 
political strategy, Nixon welcomed polarization,” planning and strategiz-
 44. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Prof’l Responsibility & Office of Inspector Gen., An 
Investigation of Allegations of Politicized Hiring and Other Improper Personnel Actions in the Civil 
Rights Division (July 2, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0901/final.pdf. 
 45.  See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text (conceding that cases of mixed motive 
decision making must be considered political if a concept of pure partisanship is to do any analytical 
work). 
 46.  Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Senators Chastise Gonzales at Hearing, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 
2007, at A1. Another example, though one that is closer to a line of politics, are the Bush White 
House’s “faith based initiative,” which David Frum has admitted “was pursued primarily to woo 
religious voters, rather than to remedy social problems.” Skinner, supra note 7, at 617. 
 47.  See RONALD BROWNSTEIN, THE SECOND CIVIL WAR: HOW EXTREME PARTISANSHIP 
HAS PARALYZED WASHINGTON AND POLARIZED AMERICA 101 (2007). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 100. 
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ing his actions from the constant perspective of Democrat versus Repub-
lican.50
Both ends and means in political acts—those that cannot be charac-
terized as taken solely for party advantage or as purely neutral admini-
stration—are by far the majority of Executive Branch decisions, and, as I 
explain below,51 for reasons of mixed motives, all decisions including 
legitimate consideration of actual policy preference, ideological dis-
agreement, legitimate resource-allocation issues, and political coalition-
building, among many more, must be conceptualized as proper political 
decisions if a delimiting of partisan actions is to provide any useful in-
sights. Partisan advantage, on the other hand, relates to those decisions 
made with either the means, or for the ends, of pure party advantage. 
Discouraging legitimate participation in democratic elections to benefit a 
particular party or bringing an individual prosecution based on a Presi-
dent’s legislative agenda may both be examples of naked partisanship. 
Mobilizing government resources either through personnel hiring, firing, 
or reassignment, or for the purpose of driving party-based campaign fun-
draising, are also likely examples of actions taken for purely partisan rea-
sons; though, of course, issues of how these decisions are characterized 
remain.52 Finally, examples of patronage, directing government con-
tracts, or making policy in expectancy of a quid pro quo donation may 
also be examples of purely partisan behavior that has no end beyond par-
ty and electoral advantage. 
A discussion of partisanship will thus often begin in terms of ends 
and conclude discussing means. An example: Suppose a Republican 
President enacts a voter fraud prevention policy. He could do so because 
he believes voter fraud is a legitimate policy concern. He could enact the 
same policy on the grounds that increasing visibility of prosecutions, 
even unfounded ones, would discourage voters who typically support 
Democrats from voting whether they are eligible or not. Enacted for the 
former reason, the policy is political; for the latter, partisan. Such discus-
sions often devolve into means because it is easier to detect pretext in 
means than in ends; in ends it is almost always possible for those in the 
room to concoct ex post justifications. More detailed metrics of partisan-
ship are needed to flesh out the distinction and the continuum on which it 
operates, and I develop these metrics below. However, for now, such 
generalities capture the essence of the distinction. 
 50.  See id. at 102. 
 51. See infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 52. For an excellent discussion of characterization in determining political or partisan mo-
tives in decision making, see Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, ‘The U.S. Attorneys Scandal’ and 
the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L. J. 187, 235–37 (2008). 
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b.  Recognition of the political/partisan distinction and the limits of 
impure partisanship. A distinction between the concepts of party-based 
partisanship and more typical politics has existed since before the Found-
ing. Semantically, historical usage supports a strong differentiation be-
tween these two concepts.53 The word “partisan” not surprisingly derives 
from the word “party.”54 Even the use of “partisan” in its military mean-
ing contained a somewhat negative connotation, describing a corps of 
military engaged in “surprising” and “desultory warfare.”55 The distinc-
tion has long existed conceptually as well. In an appendix to Black-
stone’s Commentaries, published in 1770, “political” is used to describe 
those of “political wisdom,” whereas “partisan” is used in conjunction an 
extreme adjective: “zealous partizan[s].”56 Such a conception crossed the 
Atlantic. “Equating parties with nefarious ‘factions,’ the Framers at-
tempted to design a ‘Constitution Against Parties.’”57 Publius also dis-
tinguished between the concepts of “partisan” and “political.” Whereas 
Hamilton referred to “politics” as a “science,”58 grouped “politicians” 
with “statesmen,”59 and used “political” as a sometimes-solemnizing de-
scription that related to policymaking or beliefs about individual rights,60 
the Federalist used the term “partisan” to refer to narrow, factional inter-
est.61 Later, Jacksonian-era civil service reformers considered “the yoke 
of party discipline” the “curse of our politics.”62 The term post-partisan 
is of more recent vintage. William Safire traced the first usage of the 
word “post-partisan” to a 1976 New York Times article describing the 
post-Watergate “disenchanted electorate,” which had the potential to 
“shape new parties, realign the old ones or extend the history of erosion 
into a new ‘post-partisan’ era.”63 While there has thus historically been a 
 53.  NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 522, 551 (1872) (defining 
“partisan” as “1. An adherent to a party or faction” or “2. (a.) Engaged in irregular warfare or out-
posts. (b.) Any member of such a corps.”; “partisanship” as the “State of being partisan; adherence 
to a party”; and “political” as “1. Pertaining to public policy or politics; relating to state affairs . . . 2. 
Derived from office or connection with government; public”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56.  AN INTERESTING APPENDIX TO SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND, Part III, 66–67 (Phil., Bell, 1772). 
 57.  Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 8 (quoting RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A 
PARTY SYSTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780–1840, at 40 
(1969)). 
 58.  THE FEDERALIST No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 59.  THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 60.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 1 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 61.  See THE FEDERALIST No. 4 (John Jay), No. 46 (James Madison). 
 62.  WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY, 1830–1900, at 63 
(1982). 
 63. See William Safire, On Language: Postpartisan, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 10, 2008) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/10/magazine/10wwln-safire-t.html, (discussing the origin of the 
term post-partisan and concluding that from the standpoint of usage, sources are inconsistent on its 
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difference in the usage of the terms “partisan” and “political,” as well as 
the concepts that the terms embody, even today the distinction can do 
analytical work. 
The most high-profile Supreme Court case that provides insight on 
the political-partisan distinction is Bush v. Gore.64 In subsequent criti-
cism of that case, many legal commentators set up critiques of the deci-
sion by differentiating between typical political decision making, which 
realists often accept as an inherent aspect of adjudication, with a different 
type of partisan concern from Bush that related not to ideological differ-
ences but to outcomes of elections and party advantage.65 For example, 
Jesse Choper’s response to Bush claimed that “it is critical to distinguish 
between judicial (or jurisprudential) ideology and political ideology (or 
crude partisanship).”66 The attacks on Bush generally did not focus on a 
Justice acting consistently with her ideological views—essentially acting 
as either a conservative or liberal.67 They instead questioned the Court’s 
legitimacy when weighing in on which political party would win an elec-
tion. In drawing these distinctions, Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson 
distinguished the “‘high’ politics [of] larger political principles and ideo-
logical goals” from the “‘low’ politics of partisan political advantage.”68 
from, through preferring the un-hyphenated form: “postpartisan”). 
 64.  531 U.S. 98 (2000). See also Posting of Michael C. Dorf to Dorf on Law, available at 
http://michaeldorf.org/2007/03/dont-say-political-say-partisan.html (Mar. 19, 2007). 
 65.  See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 
110 YALE L.J. 1407, 1408–09 (2001); Sanford Levinson, Return of Legal Realism, THE NATION, 
Jan. 8, 2001, at 8; see Bruce Ackerman, Off Balance, in Bush v. Gore 192, 197–98 (Bruce Ackerman 
ed., 2002); see generally ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT 
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000, at 4–10, 116–17, 194 (2001); Guido Calabresi, In Partial (but not Parti-
san) Praise of Principle, in BUSH V. GORE, supra, at 67, 71–77;; cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE 
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 129–56 (2006) (discuss-
ing judges’ party affiliation and judicial track records, especially on hot “political” issues, though not 
engaging in the same critiques of illegitimacy as the commentators critiquing Bush); See also David 
C. Weiss, Note, Nothing Improper? Examining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Parti-
san Motivation, and Pretextual Justification in the U.S. Attorney Removals, 107 MICH. L. REV. 317, 
359–60 (2008) (differentiating between removals effected for partisan or political reasons). 
 66.  Jesse H. Choper, Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential 
Election of 2000, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 335, 347 (2001). 
 67.  Such a discussion regarding the views that a judge or justice brings to her work is be-
yond the scope of this Article. 
 68.  See Balkin, supra note 65, at 1408–09 (citing Levinson, supra note 65, at 8). See also 
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 
1045, 1062–63 (2001). Balkin and Levinson also note a speech from Justice Breyer that they say 
exemplifies their distinction between “high politics” and “low politics.” Justice Breyer stated: 
Politics in our decision-making process does not exist. By politics, I mean . . . will it help certain 
individuals be elected? . . . Personal ideology or philosophy is a different matter . . . . Judges have 
had different life experiences and different kinds of training, and they come from different back-
grounds. Judges appointed by different presidents of different political parties may have different 
views about the interpretation of the law and its relation to the world. 
Stephen G. Breyer, The Work of the Supreme Court, Am. Acad. of Arts and Sci., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 
47, quoted in Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the ‘Le-
gal Model’ of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 490 n.26 (2001). 
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According to Balkin and Levinson, “The unseemliness of Bush v. Gore 
stems from the overwhelming suspicion that the members of the five per-
son majority were willing to make things up out of whole cloth—and, 
equally importantly, contrary to the ways that they usually innovated—in 
order to ensure a Republican victory.”69 Bush v. Gore thus allows for 
significant insight into the difference between acting for party-based mo-
tivations as opposed to mere ideological, i.e. political, disagreement. 
One recent set of events that sheds light on the political-partisan dis-
tinction was the U.S. attorney removals during the George W. Bush Ad-
ministration.70 In perhaps the most similar discussion to this Article, Pro-
fessors Bruce Green and Fred Zacharias have compellingly described 
motivations for prosecution in the context of the firings, noting the “se-
mantic and substantive problem of distinguishing neutral prosecutions, 
politics, and partisan politics.”71 They recognized the difficulty of such 
an inquiry, arguing that a “‘political’ decision in the policy sense can si-
multaneously be a ‘partisan’ decision, and the two features will some-
times be inseparable.”72 Their discussion is of imperfect applicability as 
it focuses solely on prosecution, but their recognition of the distinction 
for which I argue is important. Though they see many intractable prob-
lems with separating decision-makers’ motives, they also recognize that 
detecting pretext in certain decisions—regardless of how decision-
makers characterize their decisions after the fact—is possible when as-
serting otherwise defies belief or reason.73
Commentators in other contexts have also noted a distinction be-
tween two types of politics—what I refer to as partisan advantage and 
political choice—though such discussions have almost always been in 
passing. In the historical context, commentators describing the hyper-
partisanship of America’s “party period” during the 1820s and 1830s 
have noted that “partisan officeholders” had only limited public policy 
duties expected of them; however, such partisans “genuinely excelled” at 
“allocating economic resources and privileges” to party men, carrying 
out their “partisan policy-making activities.”74 Covering more recent 
events, Robert Leflar has described two types of politics, one as “the re-
alistic reconciliation of claims to justice in our society” and the other as 
 69.  Balkin & Levinson, supra note 68, at 1064. 
 70.  See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Prof’l Responsibility & Office of Inspector 
Gen., An Investigation into the Removal of Nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006 (Sept. 2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/us-att-firings-rpt092308.pdf (detailing U.S. attorney removals). 
 71.  Green & Zacharias, supra note 52, at 224. 
 72. Id. at 229. 
 73.  See id. at 240–42. Again, this is similar to Balkin’s and Levinson’s claims “that it is al-
most impossible to believe that the best explanation of the result [in Bush v. Gore] is the internal 
logic of the law.” Balkin & Levinson, supra note 68, at 1064. 
 74.  See RICHARD L. MCCORMICK, THE PARTY PERIOD AND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (1988). 
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merely “backroom venality or the buying of votes.”75
Leflar is not alone.76 In describing prosecution, Professors Donald 
Moynihan and Alasdair Roberts have noted that “[w]hile U.S. state attor-
neys were traditionally regarded as positions above partisan intrigue, 
they were still political positions.”77 Finally, in their important article de-
scribing the role of party politics on the theoretical foundations of sepa-
ration of powers, Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes allude to the differ-
ence between “partisan political competition” that dominates modern 
political organization and relates to elections and a more policy-based 
“political competition” under the Madisonian vision by which govern-
ment branches would check each other, promoting the power and inde-
pendence of government departments.78
Cases involving gerrymandering also raise the issue of when an in-
herently political process crosses some line of partisanship that renders 
the character of decision making somehow different. In Vieth v. Jube-
lirer, for example, Democratic Pennsylvania voters brought a claim al-
leging that Pennsylvania’s redistricting following the 2000 census was an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.79 The case resulted in a plurality 
opinion in which four justices found the claim not justiciable; four found 
the claim justiciable, but they produced three potential methods for dis-
cerning unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.80 In dissent, Justices 
Souter and Ginsburg recognized the difficulty of culling the partisan po-
litical decisions from the more general political decisions, writing that 
the “Court’s job must be to identify clues . . . indicating that partisan 
competition has reached an extremity of unfairness.”81 The dissenting 
justices explained that if the plaintiffs could make out a prima facie case 
of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering, the burden should then be 
on the government to demonstrate legitimate reasons for its actions “by 
 75.  Robert A. Leflair, Honest Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 721, 740 (1979) 
 76.  See, e.g., Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency of Executive Branch 
Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 581, 584 n.28 (2009). Author 
Chris Mooney has used such a distinction in his discussion of “political science abuse,” which he 
defined as “any attempt to inappropriately undermine, alter, or otherwise interfere with the scientific 
process, or scientific conclusions, for political or ideological reasons.” CHRIS MOONEY, THE 
REPUBLICAN WAR ON SCIENCE 17 (2006). Mooney uses the terms “partisan” and “political” inter-
changeably, but he is unquestionably referring to the difference between acceptable differences of 
political opinion and more cynical party advantage. Id. at 45, 51, 224–47. 
 77.  Donald P. Moynihan & Alasdair Roberts, The End of an Idea? The Bush Administration 
and the Exhaustion of the Politicized Presidency 12 (Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Research 
Paper 09-17) (emphasis added), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1316554. 
 78.  See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 2–3, 6–7, 10, 26, 39, 62. 
 79. 541 U.S. 267, 271–73 (2004). 
 80.  See id. at 281; id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 343 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 
355 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 81. Id. at 344 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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reference to objectives other than naked partisan advantage.”82 They rec-
ommended a burden-shifting framework designed to produce as many 
facts as possible during litigation, but it did not settle the question of how 
to determine improper partisan advantage from more typical political 
choice. The justices did clearly recognize the problem, and sometimes-
necessity, of differentiating between the two types of behavior and deci-
sion making.83 Such calls to uncover pretext are similar to Green and Za-
charias’ statement that, despite characterization problems undermining 
the separation of partisan from merely political decisions, some circum-
stances produce facts that subsequent rationalizations cannot explain 
away.84
Thus, whether something is “political” or “partisan” is likely best 
understood in relative terms or as a question of degree. Professors Levin-
son and Pildes have cautioned in the context of the law/politics distinc-
tion that “[l]egal culture has become rightly skeptical of the bright-line 
distinction between value judgments about ends and technocratic deci-
sionmaking about means, and of the legitimacy or desirability of rule by 
politically unaccountable ‘experts’ . . . .”85 But the distinction between 
politics and partisanship assumes no naive government decision-making 
processes divorced from public choice-based motivations. On the con-
trary, to many observers, the problem with the Bush Administration’s 
partisanship—though I will not yet engage the point—was that the Ad-
ministration allowed the strategy of political control “to be corrupted for 
purposes that had little to do with the accomplishment of administration 
priorities.”86 This is the crux of the difference described above. Acting 
politically has ends that relate to policy goals of an administration and its 
ideological allies. Acting in a partisan way is decision making and action 
materially divorced from policy goals, and rather focused on ends such 
as party advantage, fundraising, or elections. Determining whether an 
administration is behaving politically or in a partisan manner is best ex-
plained by comparison to the only logical benchmarks: other administra-
tions. The metrics that I develop below set up a framework for engaging 
in this comparison.87
An important concession in setting up this partisan/political distinc-
tion is the fact that many decisions and policies are entered into for both 
political and partisan reasons. Such an admission, no doubt, limits the 
force of my thesis, but to claim otherwise would be to unrealistically in-
 82. Id. at 351. 
 83. See id. at 347–51. 
 84. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 52, at 240–42 (2008). 
 85. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 65–66. 
 86.  Moynihan & Roberts, supra note 77, at 5. 
 87. See discussion infra Section I.B.2. 
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sist on formalistic boxes in which decisions must be either labeled parti-
san or political. Rejecting such an approach, I argue that there are some 
decisions for which enough information is available, based on the met-
rics below, to find a presumption of partisanship—decision-making 
processes or policies that were conceived or enacted for mere electoral 
gain. This is similar to Professor Choper’s claim that in analyzing Bush 
to determine whether a particular Justice was acting in a jurisprudential 
or partisan fashion, an inquiry is necessary to determine whether the pur-
ported doctrinal reasons for the decision were pretext.88 Professors Green 
and Zacharias have claimed in analyzing the U.S. attorney firings that 
“co-dependency of the rationales for prosecuting suggests that it is often 
foolhardy to even attempt to characterize decisions” as either “political” 
or “partisan,” and that “actual motivation is difficult to ascertain by any-
one other than the actor himself. Even after the fact it can be rarely 
proven.”89 Maybe so, and, undoubtedly, there are many decisions for 
which it is not possible to conduct an ex post screening of decisional 
elements. However, decision makers know why they actually made a 
particular decision. Green and Zacharias assert that “when viewed from 
the outside . . . many discretionary decisions can be characterized in mul-
tiple ways, depending on where the person doing the characterizing 
places the emphasis.”90
This also seems correct, but I argue that it is possible to move toward 
creating a framework for analyzing decisions to see if a claim of genuine 
policy decision or political choice is actually pretext for a decision moti-
vated by partisan advantage. Claiming that such an effort “often is fool-
hardy” is to give up without trying to detect the types of partisan pretext 
that concerned Justices Souter and Ginsburg in Vieth and concerned 
Congress and the public in the U.S. attorney firings. Those instances of 
partisan pretext are the ones that undercut the rationale of accountability 
for judicial deference to the Executive Branch and for broad executive 
power, as well as limit the separation of powers checks across 
branches;91 they also allow us to think about what it means to be post-
partisan. 
A final problem with the political/partisan distinction is that in 
speaking in passing of such a distinction, commentators tend to lapse into 
criticism of political, value-based judgments with which they simply dis-
agree.92 This slippery slope into a policy debate dressed up as a discus-
 88.  See Choper, supra note 66, at 348. 
 89.  Green & Zacharias, supra note 52, at 230, 244. 
 90. Id. at 230. 
 91. See discussion infra Section III.B.2. 
 92.  See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Don’t Politicize Science (Unless You’re on My Side) (Case 
Research Paper Series in Legal Studies), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=958826 (reviewing 
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sion about partisanship is exactly what occurred with the back-and-forth 
over partisanship in the health care reform debate, for example.93 How-
ever, rather than providing a reason that one should not delimit partisan 
decisions from broader political ones, this slippage provides a reason for 
engaging in the project. Having a set of a priori factors, which are cre-
ated to be as objective as possible, against which one can think about the 
degree to which decision making is partisan, helps prevent this concep-
tual and rhetorical slide toward a debate about partisanship as a proxy for 
simply policy disagreement. 
 
2.  Metrics of partisanship 
 
In his farewell address, after two terms as America’s first President, 
George Washington used the opportunity to warn a still-fragile nation to 
work for unity and beware of the “misrepresentations” of faction and 
“the jealousies and heartburnings which spring from these misrepresenta-
tions.”94 More than two centuries later, his concern with partisanship still 
rings true. But determining what constitutes partisanship, and specifically 
partisan action and decision making in the Executive Branch, is a more 
difficult task. In beginning to sketch metrics of partisanship, this Article 
pinpoints a number of likely metrics based on recurring themes in criti-
cism of Executive Branch partisanship. None of these metrics, alone, 
would dispositively prove partisan behavior because lone acts and deci-
sions can almost always be re-characterized. However, I argue that 
viewed as a whole, if most of the metrics of partisanship are present, then 
a non-party based explanation from an administration is likely pretext. In 
the words of Justices Souter and Ginsburg, the metrics of partisanship 
developed here serve, together, as “clues . . . indicating that partisan 
competition has reached an extremity of unfairness.”95
In developing the metrics of partisanship, this Article deploys a two-
pronged methodology. First, the idea is that there are many presidential 
watchdogs—Congress, the media, governance groups, legal commenta-
tors, and eventually historians—and that these actors raise enough claims 
of partisanship, founded or unfounded, that common critiques of Execu-
tive Branch hyper-partisanship emerge. The metrics discussed below rep-
and critiquing MOONEY, supra note 76); Moynihan & Roberts, supra note 77, at 18–19 (criticizing 
the Bush Administration’s decision to ignore scientists’ advice in promoting abstinence as opposed 
to more effective measures to prevent sexually transmitted diseases and promoting family planning 
that the Administration viewed as condoning sexual activity among young people). 
 93.  See, e.g., Shiner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
 94.  George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 19, 1796), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN 
STATES PAPERS: SPEECHES AND MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES TO BOTH 
HOUSES OF CONGRESS 34, 36 (1833). 
 95. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 351 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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resent a compilation of commentators’ claims of Executive action or de-
cision making that are likely—for structural reasons in any administra-
tion—to be directed at party advantage or partisanship. Second, I use il-
lustrative examples of such actions from the Nixon Administration 
through the Clinton Administration to highlight a sliding scale from neu-
tral policy and legal authority (or as close to neutral as may exist), 
through political choice, to partisan advantage.96 While it is not possible 
to catalog all allegations of partisanship since the Nixon Administration 
in such a short Article, the examples provide useful illustrations of party-
based behavior. Thus, based on legal and political commentary and 
events from 1968 through 2000,97 I argue that criticisms and examples of 
excessive partisanship can be captured in the following five metrics: 
first, the amount of emphasis placed on expertise in Executive Branch 
process; second, the level of specificity of political involvement in policy 
choices as well as the related elements of the transparency and account-
ability about that specificity; third, personnel management, including ju-
dicial appointments; fourth, actions and decision making related to elec-
tion policies and fundraising; and fifth, relationship building. 
a.  Expertise. The emphasis on expertise has a longer pedigree than 
most arguments for independent, neutral decision making; however, it is 
important not to overstate the degree to which such independence exists. 
In any case, an Administration’s willingness to rely on or override exper-
tise is often cited as a harbinger of partisanship in a White House. Some 
commentators have argued that placing partisanship above expertise 
threatens the very heart of modern, agency-based Executive Branch op-
eration.98 Historically, political scientists also claimed that policy deci-
sions directed by party-based concerns undermined rationality in policy-
making, eliminating even the possibility of neutral competence 
 96.  I have chosen this time period because the Nixon White House is often viewed as the 
first “modern” administration in terms of its frequent party focus and control of the bureaucracy, as 
well as the fact that it represented the first presidency in which the southern states primarily sup-
ported a Republican—a party and ideological alignment that was building for decades and appears 
unlikely to abate any time in the near future. See Skinner, supra note 7, at 615 (“Richard Nixon set 
the pattern for presidents taking greater control of the executive branch.”). It is also important that 
with one exception, the period from Nixon until Bush was characterized almost exclusively by di-
vided government. One could analyze claims of excessive partisanship from any number of periods, 
but given the history of such things as the Sedition Act and the political dimension of the Supreme 
Court’s removal power cases. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Humphrey’s Execu-
tor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), such a long historical reach is unlikely to provide claims that counsel 
for significantly different metrics of partisanship. 
 97.  Though relying on the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations would be helpful, 
using criticisms of their practices and then deploying those same practices to show their partisanship 
would be detrimentally circular. 
 98.  MOONEY, supra note 76 (stating that partisan decision making in the executive branch 
“threatens not just our public health and the environment, but the very integrity of American democ-
racy, which relies heavily on scientific and technical expertise to function”). 
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inherently based on the kind of “objective standards” that are “embodied 
in expert knowledge.”99 This intuition in its more recent incarnation has 
led to the claim that proponents of highly partisan decision making have 
“essentially challenged the proposition that objective standards exist.”100 
Political scientists have noted the partisan nature of increasing rejection 
of administrative expertise.101 The Supreme Court also recently reiterated 
the value of expertise, explaining that it based its assumptions of con-
gressional intent in delegating on a determination that a particular agency 
possesses “historical familiarity and policymaking expertise.”102 Justice 
Breyer has argued that the professional bureaucracy benefits greatly from 
the “inherent” benefits of expertise, rationality, and insulation.103
As in the law/politics debate, I need not argue here for a form of ex-
pertise devoid of political considerations. The statements above, focusing 
on the emphasis that an administration places on expertise,104 are likely 
driven by an intuition that an administration’s willingness to override ex-
pertise provides one of the few visible windows into the degree to which 
partisan concerns drive Executive Branch decision making. Thus instead 
of debating whether neutral decision making is possible, I borrow a defi-
nition from Professor Hugh Heclo who described expertise in administra-
tion—”neutral competence” in his words—as “loyalty that argues 
back.”105 To examine post-partisanship we need not be overly concerned 
with the injection of some politics into administrative decision making. 
Partisan policies and partisan decision making are problematic, instead, 
when party advantage wholly corrupts the process or predetermines an 
outcome—when experts are used as degree veneer on a preconceived 
process and predetermined outcomes, as pretext for objective decision 
making. 
Considering these issues against a historical backdrop shows that, in 
terms of reliance on expertise, partisanship has generally increased over 
time. Nixon, notoriously skeptical of the bureaucracy, created a “counter-
bureaucracy” with a staff of political appointees in the White House 
more than double that employed in the Johnson Administration, as well 
as an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) remade from the Bureau 
 99.  See, e.g., Herbert Kaufman, Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administra-
tion, 50 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1057, 1060–61 (1956). 
 100. Moynihan & Roberts, supra note 77, at 15 (citing Anthony Bertelli & Laurence E. Lynn, 
Jr., Managerial Responsibility, PUB. ADMIN. REV. 259, 262 (2003)). 
 101.  See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 7, at 606. 
 102.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 103.  See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS RISK CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 61 (1993). 
 104.  See supra notes and accompanying text 98–103. 
 105.  See Hugh Heclo, OMB and the Presidency—The Problem of Neutral Competence, 38 
PUB. INT. 80 (1975). 
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of the Budget to bring non-budgetary matters under presidential con-
trol.106 Ford and Carter expanded this precedent incrementally, particu-
larly with Carter’s requirement that agencies submit proposed rules to the 
Regulatory Analysis Review Group, a new policy group consisting of 
White House appointees, though it was still understood that the agencies 
had the final call.107 President Reagan represented a “sea change” in cen-
tralization and possibility for political override of expert decision making 
with the now famous Executive Order 12,291, which required agencies 
to prepare a “Regulatory Impact Analysis” for every proposed “major 
rule.”108 Reagan used this authority to return a number of important rules 
from OMB back to the agencies. President Clinton may have injected 
more politics into agencies than did Reagan due to the Clinton White 
House’s involvement in even minor policy matters. Elena Kagan, for ex-
ample, has described the “presidential administration of the Clinton bu-
reaucracy as typified by his use of directives.109 In very briefly describ-
ing this history I do not argue that at a certain point this behavior became 
partisan; I simply claim that the behavior and decision-making processes 
of the Clinton Administration with respect to agency expertise are un-
questionably more political than under Nixon.110
At each step of this history, as expert bureaucrats were given less au-
thority to “argue back,” the role of expertise was reduced in favor of 
politics. The problem with this politicization is that as White House con-
trol becomes more all-encompassing, it creates more opportunities for 
interest group involvement in rulemaking with an implicit promise of 
campaign contributions if the White House involves itself by forcing an 
agency to come to a favorable position.111 While ideological agreement 
could simply be understood as basic politics, as political control becomes 
tighter a threshold into partisanship may be crossed when the Executive 
Branch takes opportunities for quid pro quo, electorally-focused govern-
ance for the sole purpose of immediate campaign contributions or sup-
 106.  RICHARD P. NATHAN, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PRESIDENCY 34 (1986); see Perri E. Ar-
nold, The Managerial Presidency’s Changing Focus, Theodore Roosevelt to Bill Clinton, in THE 
MANAGERIAL PRESIDENCY 217, 222–23 (James P. Pfiffner ed., 2d ed. 1999). 
 107. See Kagan, supra note 14, at 2476–77 (2001). 
 108.  See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128–30 (1981); Kagan, supra note 107, at 
2477. 
 109.  See Kagan, supra note 14, at 2306–08, 2281, 2333, 2355–56. 
 110.  It is possible that this metric has moved towards increased politicization since Nixon 
shows that the metric is not particularly useful. However, as I discuss below, the Obama Administra-
tion has now rolled-back some of the institutional devices that George W. Bush used to politicize the 
bureaucracy, suggesting that the metric need not always move more toward politicization. See infra 
notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
 111.  At least one study has directly tracked these quid pro quo campaign contributions with a 
temporal axis, demonstrating the cynical nature of, in that case, congressional campaign donations. 
See infra notes 156–159 and accompanying text. The political space created by increasing White 
House control of agencies creates the same opportunity as to Executive Branch behavior as well. 
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port. Use of or willingness to undermine expertise is thus one metric of 
partisanship. In discussing increasing partisanization of expertise, I do 
not seek to create a formalistic, partisan expertise threshold. I simply 
point out that various employments of expertise can, in fact, appear dif-
ferent to a reasonable observer. For example, setting aside the normative 
dynamic, the way in which OMB has brought politics into agency agenda 
setting is unquestionably closer to partisanship than Justice Breyer’s pro-
posal “for a centralized corps of regulatory experts, more detached from 
the President than OMB’s current staff.”112
b.  Specificity and accountability of policymaking. Commentators 
have recognized a second area in which Presidents often face criticism 
for taking party-based action: the level of specificity of political in-
volvement in policy choices and the openness with which that politiciza-
tion is conducted. In other words, to what degree do senior political ap-
pointees direct minor details of policymaking, and how honest is the 
Executive Branch with Congress and the public about the way in which it 
reaches decisions? Dealing with the level of policy formulation first, 
those who support as much injection of politics as possible essentially 
challenge the existence of objective standards. Indeed, as Professors 
Moynihan and Roberts argue, “This challenge is most persuasive at the 
highest levels of policy formulation and general management, and least 
persuasive in those areas where scientific knowledge is most highly de-
veloped.”113 At the high levels of policy formulation, for example, there 
are many arguments for the President’s role in serving a coordination 
function, sometimes through OMB, to eliminate redundancies and incon-
sistencies, energize agencies in a temporally consistent manner, and hold 
agencies to general regulatory principles to apply throughout the admini-
stration.114 From a separation of powers perspective, Bruce Ackerman 
has also noted that a President calling a judge about a case is “treated as 
a crime against the Constitution,” while “a similar call to a middle-level 
bureaucrat” is not, though Ackerman believes that such a call poses a 
similar “threat to the separation of powers when considered as a doctrine 
of functional specialization.”115
Such a focus on the type of decision being made can also be seen in 
the Supreme Court’s removal power jurisprudence. The Court’s state-
ment in Myers v. United States, the famous case that—before being lim-
ited by Humphreys Executor v. United States116 and Wiener v. United 
 112.  Kagan, supra note 14, at 2341. 
 113.  Moynihan & Roberts, supra note 77, at 15. 
 114.  See Kagan, supra note 14, at 2340. 
 115.  Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 690–91 
(2000). 
 116. Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
259] DEFENSE OF THE POST-PARTISAN PRESIDENT 283 
 
States,117 and “wholly eviscerated” by Morrison v. Olson118—stood for 
some limits on the President’s removal power. Even the unitary vision 
expressed in Myers conceded that “[o]f course there may be duties so pe-
culiarly and specifically committed to the discretion of a particular offi-
cer as to raise a question whether the President may overrule or revise 
the officer’s interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular in-
stance.”119 Elena Kagan has understood this passage as suggesting “that 
even when Congress cannot at all limit the President’s power to remove 
an official, Congress may be able to confine the President’s capacity to 
direct that official as to the exercise of his delegated discretion.”120 Ka-
gan has convincingly argued that similar considerations may be relevant 
if the President specifically directs, for example, the beginning, termina-
tion, or tactics of a particular legal action.121 She focuses on issues of 
prosecution because “it is in this area, because so focused on particular 
individuals and firms, that the crassest forms of politics (involving, at the 
extreme, personal favors and vendettas) pose the greatest danger of dis-
placing professionalism and thereby undermining confidence in legal de-
cisionmaking.”122
Historically, administrations have placed relatively fewer political 
appointees in agencies that demand technical knowledge and profes-
sional expertise, though such generalizations are not as easily made 
about approaches to accountability. A particularly clear example of the 
slippage towards partisanship as high-level officials become involved in 
specific decisions was Richard Nixon’s “enemies list” of tax audit sub-
jects.123 A more recent example of specificity on the opposite end of the 
continuum was the fact that despite Clinton’s deep involvement in ad-
ministrative issues, Clinton shrank from involvement in agency adjudica-
tion, never attempting to publicly usurp the powers of a department head 
or agency’s on-the-record determinations.124 That said, Clinton im-
mersed himself in the details of policymaking, seeking a way to effect 
change without having to go through Congress, and in this way, his in-
 117.  Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
 118.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, (1988); see Saikrishna Prakash, The Story of Myers 
and its Wayward Successors: Going Postal on the Removal Power, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
STORIES 302 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
 119.  Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). 
 120.  Kagan, supra note 14, at 2323. 
 121.  See id. at 2357–58. 
 122. Id. at 2357–58. 
 123.  JOHN A. ANDREWS, POWER TO DESTROY: THE POLITICAL USES OF THE IRS FROM 
KENNEDY TO NIXON 217–58 (2002). 
 124.  See Kagan, supra note 14, at 2307. 
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volvement could also be characterized, as it was by the Republican Con-
gress, as highly partisan.125
Another related variable in the equation is the degree to which an 
Administration acknowledges or covers up political involvement in the 
decision-making process, essentially, its accountability. On this view, re-
gardless of the degree of politicization of administrative decision mak-
ing, particular fire alarms are sounded when that politicization is either 
achieved secretly or, perhaps worse, covered-up after the fact. As Kagan 
has described, “To the extent that presidential supervision of agencies 
remains hidden from public scrutiny, the President will have greater 
freedom to play to parochial interests.”126 A President’s insistence on 
hiding his involvement from public scrutiny almost certainly enhances 
the potential for the influence of party or faction over the decision-
making process.127 These types of secretive behaviors are often moti-
vated by a quest for party advantage and, indeed, have been a typical 
criticism when Presidents have sought to limit their accountability.128 
One of the primary concerns with Ronald Reagan’s centralization of bu-
reaucratic control in the 1980s, for example, was the secrecy with which 
OMB and the White House essentially rewrote rules and included regu-
lated interest groups in the regulatory decisions.129 Reagan usually 
worked “to veil his and his staff’s influence over administration.”130 In 
contrast, Clinton’s unprecedented use of and willingness to take credit 
for his directive authority, though it injected more politics into decision 
making, provided accountability benefits that were a departure from the 
focus on confidentiality in political involvement in the Reagan—and to 
some extent George H.W. Bush—years.131
 125.  This is one example where the warning from Professors Green and Zacharias regarding 
characterization seem particularly relevant. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 52, at 224–29. While 
the Republican Congress characterized the Clinton White House’s involvement in the minutia of 
policymaking as highly partisan, administration officials would undoubtedly characterize these ef-
forts as achieving policy and ideological goals in the face of resistance from an obstinate Congress. 
As such, examples that are open to credible characterization on both sides, may have to be treated as 
mere political actions if there is to be a conceptual distinction between politics and pure partisanship. 
 126. Kagan, supra note 14, at 2337. 
 127.  See id. 
 128.  There are, of course, many other reasons for which the President may desire to keep cer-
tain Executive Branch decisions secret. Foreign affairs and national security decisions are such ex-
amples where secrecy may not immediately invoke accountability concerns. However, those that 
argue for a broad vision of the unitary executive draw a strong connection between popular electoral 
accountability and the desirability of a unitary executive. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attributing executive action as responsive to popular opinion, which is 
based on public information); see, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 33 (justifying normative claims for a 
unitary executive on the benefits of increased accountability). It is not thus unfair to link lack of pub-
lic information with lack of an electorally-based political check. 
 129.  See Kagan, supra note 14, at 2333. 
 130. Id. 
 131.  See id. at 2250. 
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c.  Personnel management. A third metric of partisanship that is a 
common thread in both legal and popular commentary is personnel man-
agement—the types of political appointees that an administration makes 
and the process in which it engages in hiring, firing, and transfer deci-
sions. Building on the previous point, we should be less skeptical of in-
tensely politicized personnel policies for higher-level officials than for 
those lower on the bureaucratic chain. Elliot Richardson, former cabinet 
secretary in the Carter and Nixon Administrations, noted in 1985 that the 
expansion of political appointments and centralized White House control 
into lower and lower levels of the bureaucracy had resulted in having to 
settle for less qualified people—”turkeys” in his words—to fill those jobs 
than would typically be required for political appointees.132 While it is 
expected that less powerful jobs would attract less qualified candidates, 
the problem with younger, less experienced political appointees is that 
when their inexperience and immaturity is combined with the increas-
ingly partisan tests for becoming a political appointee,133 judgment is 
likely to be less rational, less expert, and less thoughtful.134 Despite the 
importance of the process by which the White House chooses these 
lower-level appointees, many commentators continue to focus on the 
types of bureaucrats appointed at high-level positions, which can still 
yield insights about the partisan stance of an administration.135
The historical trend is mixed. At the higher levels, Nixon sought out 
a bipartisan cabinet, offering to appoint his campaign opponent, Hubert 
Humphrey, as the United Nations Ambassador and seeking out Democ-
ratic Senator Henry Jackson as Defense Secretary.136 Though both de-
clined, Nixon’s offers were genuine and aimed at moving beyond parti-
sanship, and, in fact, Nixon did bring in Democrats John Connally as 
Treasury Secretary and Daniel Patrick Moynihan as a senior domestic 
policy advisor.137 As the Nixon Administration progressed, however, the 
cabinet makeup gradually changed to reflect Nixon’s “preoccupation . . . 
with centralizing control in the White House.”138 Carter appointed a cab-
inet that was not entirely partisan and one that many considered more 
expertise-oriented and less representative of typical Democratic interest 
 132.  See James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-
Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 57, 63 (1987). 
 133.  See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY 26 (2007) (describing his inter-
view for a political appointment in the Office of Legal Counsel that began with a question about his 
past political contributions). 
 134.  See id. 
 135.  See Nelson W. Polsby, Presidential Cabinet Making: Lessons for the Political System, 
93 POL. SCI. Q. 15, 15 (1978). 
 136.  BROWNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 15. 
 137.  See id. at 102, 404. 
 138.  See Polsby, supra note 135, at 16. 
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groups.139 Reagan’s cabinet drew entirely from his party, while the cabi-
nets of George H.W. Bush and Clinton each included one member of the 
opposite party.140 Many commentators have also focused on the gradu-
ally expanding number of political appointees and the tendency for them 
to be further down in the bureaucracy.141 At the lower levels of bureauc-
racy the trend toward increased political control and the potential for par-
tisanization began in earnest with Reagan and his administration’s belief 
that “Personnel is policy.”142 According to Terry Moe, Reagan’s ap-
proach did “much more than continue a historical trend,” as his Admini-
stration focused on increasingly partisan appointees, subject to increasing 
central control.143 In many ways Clinton’s presidential administration 
continued and even expanded on this trend.144
Judicial appointment as a subset of personnel management is a sub-
metric from which it is difficult to discern meaning because of the impor-
tance of whether the President and the Senate are divided or unified at 
the time of appointment. While unified or divided government is an issue 
in any discussion of partisanship it is particularly prevalent in the context 
of often-politicized judicial nominations. However, commentators clearly 
look to a President’s judicial appointments to see if they tend to be ideo-
logical appointments, respected umpires, or a mix of the two.145 As such, 
judicial appointments provide more direction to the personnel manage-
ment metric. 
Historically, this trend is also mixed. Nixon, for example, demon-
strated potential partisanship, only selecting Harry Blackmun for a seat 
on the Supreme Court after his two previous nominees F. Clement 
Haynsworth Jr. and G. Harrold Carswell were deemed too conserva-
tive,146 though Nixon’s nominations undoubtedly helped his Southern 
strategy. Ford’s nomination of Justice Stevens was uncontroversial, as 
were the confirmation proceedings over Reagan’s appointment of Jus-
tices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Scalia, all confirmed without a single dis-
 139.  See id. at 20–25. 
 140.  See David Shribman, Op-Ed., Case for a Bipartisan Cabinet, POST-GAZETTE (Pitts-
burgh), Aug. 15, 2008. 
 141.  See supra notes 113–124 and accompanying text. 
 142.  John Hart, Insiders on the Outside and Outsiders on the Inside: Competing Approaches 
to Presidential Management, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 103, 104 (1990). 
 143.  Terry Moe, The Politicized Presidency, in THE NEW DIRECTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS 
271 (John Chubb & Paul Peterson eds., 1985). 
 144.  See Kagan, supra note 14, at 2281 (“[P]residential control of administration, if with a 
different policy orientation and in a different form, expanded significantly during the Clinton Presi-
dency, moving in this eight-year period to the center of the regulatory landscape.”). 
 145.  See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 7, at 616; Kevin J. McMahon, Presidents, Political Re-
gimes, and Contentious Supreme Court Nominations: A Historical Institutional Model, 32 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 919, 927–28 (2007); Martin Shapiro, Interest Groups and Supreme Court Appoint-
ments, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 935, 941–44, 954 (1990). 
 146.  See BROWNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 170. 
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senting vote. However, the process surrounding Reagan’s nomination of 
Robert Bork is an obvious exception.147 Toward the midpoint of his sec-
ond term, though Clinton’s ability to get his judicial nominees confirmed 
slowed to a trickle,148 his Supreme Court nominees were confirmed by 
wide margins. While drawing lessons from individual nominations is dif-
ficult, it is not unfair to characterize Nixon’s nominations of Haynsworth 
and Carswell as more partisan than Clinton’s nominations of Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and Stephen Breyer. 
d.  Election related policies. A fourth metric of partisanship that 
commentators have discussed is how an Administration handles both the 
necessary and discretionary decisions that directly relate to the mechan-
ics of elections—both voting and fundraising. It is with regard to the out-
comes of elections that Justices Souter and Ginsburg, as well as a num-
ber of commentators, have noted the real potential for political and legal 
powers to be used for partisan, party-based advantage.149 As they have 
pointed out, this use can undermine norms of democracy, separation of 
powers, and independence.150 In addition to the examples of the typical 
Executive Branch partisanship discussed below, commentators have 
pointed to the significant fox-henhouse problems related to voting, vote 
counting, and fundraising. The examples of Bush v. Gore, discussed 
above,151 and the House Democratic majority’s decision to seat Indiana 
Democrat Frank McCloskey in 1985 after a disputed election, for exam-
ple, illustrate behavior for which a partisan,152 election-based explanation 
is more plausible than any other. 
Though nearly all Presidents have faced claims of impropriety re-
lated to elections or fundraising, both Richard Nixon and Bill Clinton 
reached new heights of partisanship on this front during their administra-
tions. The minor scandals involving Bert Lance and alleged campaign 
improprieties in the Carter Administration, and George H.W. Bush’s 
pardoning of Casper Weinberger and others involved in Iran-Contra, 
were insignificant compared to other administrations.153 In addition, al-
though the Reagan Administration’s actions led to the massive Iran Con-
tra-Affair, these actions were more ideologically motivated and less di-
 147.  See generally ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION 
SHOOK AMERICA (2007). 
 148.  BROWNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 101, 103–04. 
 149. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 343–44, 51 (2004); Choper, supra note 66, at 
347. 
 150.  See id. 
 151.  See supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text. 
 152.  See DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE 130–31 
(1991). 
 153.  GERALD S. GREENBERG, HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S. INDEPENDENT COUNSEL 
INVESTIGATIONS 79–83 (2000). 
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rected at elections. By contrast, Nixon’s election tactics are legendary, 
and he generally sought to mobilize the vast resources of the White 
House as another arm of the Republican political operation. Nixon’s 
wiretaps, his enemies list, the White House plumbers, and “dirty tricks” 
in the 1972 campaign were all actions taken directly to influence an elec-
tion with no other plausible purpose.154 Though not reaching the same 
level as Nixon, there were many problematic occurrences within the 
Clinton White House as well. A major point of criticism of Clinton was 
the 1996 campaign finance controversy and the claims of trading prefer-
ential policies to China for political contributions. The DOJ’s investiga-
tion resulted in 22 eventual convictions for fraud and for funneling for-
eign contributions into U.S. elections.155 Among other less high-profile 
issues, the use of the White House’s Lincoln Bedroom and federal 
phones to support political fundraising and the issuance of 141 pardons 
on Clinton’s last day of office, some directed at Democratic allies and 
donors such as Marc Rich, also raised serious claims of directing official 
powers and policies for party advantage. 
A subset of the election-related metric of partisanship that I find crit-
ical but that is not often discussed by commentators, Congress, or the 
media, is decision making related to contemporaneous campaign contri-
butions. This issue is important because it is more quantifiable than most 
of the metrics discussed above and it directly relates to elections and 
party advantage. In addition, it provides leverage on the difference be-
tween the concepts of political and partisan. Consider the following ex-
ample: Some commentators have criticized the Bush Administration for 
“assaults on the most highly specialized components of the federal bu-
reaucracy,” that were “undertaken on behalf of constituencies whose 
support was critical to the conservative movement, such as industry lob-
bies or the religious right.”156 Yet, under the political/partisan distinction 
herein created,157 such complaints are actually picking a bone with typi-
cal politics. Government and political parties have every right to align 
themselves and support like-minded interest groups and ideological al-
lies, subject to plausibility limits related to expertise and personnel. That 
is politics. What begins to look more cynical and more partisan, are pol-
icy choices motivated by immediate campaign contributions. This is 
much closer to a direct quid pro quo. For example, a recent study of do-
nations to House campaigns showed that prior to an important sugar sub-
 154.  See BROWNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 104. 
 155.  See Press Release, Department of Justice, No. 01-662, Ernest G. Green Pleads Guilty to 
Tax Violations (Dec. 21, 2001), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/December/01_crm_662.htm. 
 156.  Moynihan & Roberts, supra note 77, at 16. 
 157.  See discussion supra Section I.B.1. 
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sidy vote in 2007, donations from sugar-beet and sugar-cane producing 
states increased greatly and suffered an instant drop immediately follow-
ing the subsidy vote.158 While this example is drawn from congressional 
behavior, it is a perfect example of the type of quid pro quo campaign 
contribution behavior that raises red flags as a metric of partisan behav-
ior. Such a metric is, however, impossible to develop or apply for the 
purposes of this Article because of the limited availability, particularly 
historically, for this type of donor data and the temporal connection to 
political behavior.159
e.  Relationship building. The final metric of partisanship that I dis-
cuss is relationship building, essentially a President’s efforts to engage 
the opposition party leaders in more informal settings to build up good 
will for inevitable conflicts down the road. I include this issue primarily 
for consistency, as I do not find it particularly compelling, and it is trou-
blingly anecdotal. However, commentators mention it almost universally 
when discussing the partisanship of a presidency,160 so I discuss it brief-
ly. The basic concept is that a President’s efforts to build more social and 
informal relationships outside of specific policy battles creates good will 
that can be used later to forge cooperation. Such actions also represent an 
open-mindedness and willingness to cooperate across parties that limits 
excessive partisanship by relying on previously formed, personal rela-
tionships. 
The Reagans, for example—unlike the Carters who had enjoyed a 
quiet social life—were known to spend significant time cultivating rela-
tionships both in Washington and Hollywood.161 In perhaps the best ex-
pression of relationship building, the relationship between Tip O’Neil 
and Reagan was characterized by O’Neil’s saying, which Reagan re-
peated in his memoirs, “[a]fter six o’clock we can be friends; but before 
six, it’s politics.”162 Compared to his predecessors, Clinton is properly 
viewed as more partisan given his relatively infrequent social interaction 
with Republican members of Congress and, like Carter, narrow circle of 
friends in Washington. Given the contentious relationship between Clin-
ton and the Republican Congress that impeached him, Clinton was no 
model of bipartisan socializing. However, even Clinton brainstormed 
with Newt Gingrich on agreements they could reach. Gingrich has said, 
“He and I privately got along fine. . . . We were like two graduate stu-
 158.  See Mapping a Better World, ECONOMIST, June 6, 2009. 
 159.  Unfortunately, I also assume that were this issue to become one that is frequently dis-
cussed, politicians and donors would do more work to muddy the temporal connection. However, to 
the extent that they have not yet done so, this metric is ripe for further quantitative investigation. 
 160.  See, e.g., Skinner, supra note 7, at 606. 
 161.  Allison McGevna, Obama Chic: Inside the White House Cocktail Parties, FOX NEWS, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,509831,00.html (last visited January 29, 2010). 
 162.  RONALD REAGAN, RONALD REAGAN: AN AMERICAN LIFE 234 (1991). 
290 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 24 
 
dents hanging out.”163 Of course, any account of socialization is anecdo-
tal and open to characterization, but the reputations discussed above are 
widely held and provide at least some insight into a President’s desire to 
build extra-political relationships. 
 
II.  PARTISAN METRICS APPLIED TO PRESIDENTS GEORGE W. BUSH AND 
BARACK OBAMA 
 
Having laid out and summarized the spaces in which commentators 
and the media have previously been concerned with excessive partisan-
ship overriding otherwise normal political action and decision making, I 
turn to applying these metrics to the George W. Bush and Obama Ad-
ministrations. The discussion below tracks the metrics of partisanship for 
the Bush Administration and includes anecdotal evidence where avail-
able for the Obama Administration, though it is still too early to make a 
final judgment on Obama. 
 
A.  Expertise 
 
Comparatively, the Bush Administration reached a new height in 
terms of its willingness to ignore, override, or suppress expertise. Ironi-
cally, Bush, the country’s first “MBA President” was supposed to usher 
in an era of management-focused administration in the executive of-
fice,164 and in the spring of 2000, Bush accused Clinton and Gore of en-
gaging in “the most relentlessly partisan administration in our nation’s 
history.”165 Bush, the former executive, indeed claimed that “good man-
agement” is what “makes good politics.”166 Yet despite these claims and 
the critics of Clinton’s push of politics into presidential administration,167 
Bush went further still. Concerns, for example, about partisanship di-
rectly overriding expertise or predetermining “science” in the Bush Ad-
ministration were pervasive.168 Critics assailed former oil executive Phil-
lip Cooney’s editing of EPA reports to artificially inflate the uncertainty 
surrounding climate change while downplaying evidence of human-
induced changes;169 a political appointee claimed that NASA should la-
 163.  BROWNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 168. 
 164. James P. Pfiffner, Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-
Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 6–20 (2007). 
 165.  BROWNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 226. 
 166. James Bennet, The Bush Years: C.E.O., U.S.A., N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Jan. 14, 2001. 
 167.  See Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965 (1997). 
 168.  See, e.g., STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY 
OF GOOD GOVERNMENT 163–96 (2007). 
 169.  See Andrew C. Revkin & Matthew L. Wald, Material Shows Weakening of Climate 
Change Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at A16. 
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bel the big bang a “theory” because “it is an opinion” and labeling it oth-
erwise “unduly discounts intelligent design by a creator”;170 purposeful 
efforts to suppress credible scientific evidence surrounding the regulation 
of carbon in tailpipe emissions and the attempt to bar a Department of 
Agriculture employee from releasing his findings regarding air pollution 
around hog farms also led to popular criticism.171
Another important example of the rejection of expertise was Bush’s 
actions in January 2007 to amend Executive Order 12,866 by issuing Ex-
ecutive Order 13,422, which placed significantly more decision-making 
authority in the hands of Regulatory Policy Officers who were directly 
accountable to the President.172 These officers’ authority came directly 
from agency heads who had previously been responsible for personally 
approving an agency’s regulatory plan.173 Professor Strauss has argued 
that this change resulted in “a dramatic increase in presidential control 
over regulatory outcomes—an increase effected by the President’s own 
unilateral action and not authorized by Congress.”174 In “requiring the 
approval of an official loyal to the administration before an agency takes 
action,” Strauss claimed, “these changes threaten to disturb the difficult 
but necessary balance between politicians and experts, between politics 
and law, that characterizes agency rulemaking.”175 The problem with this 
politicization of science is that it creates more opportunities for interest 
group involvement in rulemaking with an implicit promise of campaign 
contributions if the White House involves itself to come to a favorable 
position. The opportunities for quid pro quo, electorally-focused, gov-
ernance increase dramatically. 
The Obama Administration has not been without criticism regarding 
its approach to incorporating expertise into Executive Branch decision 
making, but, on balance, emphasis on technocratic expertise has seemed 
to be a significant managerial goal of the Obama Administration and its 
efforts in these areas are more prevalent than claims of shortcoming. In 
August 2009, the Administration generated some criticism in conserva-
tive circles for a political appointee overruling DOJ career staff decisions 
to move forward with civil charges against Black Panther Party members 
for voter intimidation.176 However, in general, the Administration has 
 170.  Adler, supra note 92. 
 171.  Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 37, at 53–55. 
 172.  See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007). 
 173.  Compare Exec. Order No. 13,422 § 4(b), 72 Fed. Reg. 2763, 2764 (Jan. 18, 2007), with 
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 174.  Strauss, supra note 26, at 702. 
 175. Id. 
 176.  Jerry Seper, Exclusive: No. 3 at Justice OK’d Panther Reversal, WASH. TIMES, July 30, 
2009, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/30/no-3-at-justice-okd-panther-
reversal/. 
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been praised for its technocratic approach, though it remains too early to 
make any definitive judgments. In one of its most important moves, the 
Obama Administration rescinded Executive Order 13,422, limiting its 
own power to overrule expert decision making within agencies and inject 
White House policy into decision making.177 From an institutional per-
spective this move was actually quite significant and may have been sur-
prising given Elena Kagan’s prediction that as administrations develop 
more advanced forms of presidential administration, later administrations 
would continue to build upon these successive adaptations.178 On this 
view, voluntarily ceding power from political appointees back to experts 
is unexpected. Many commentators have also praised Obama’s directive 
to agency heads setting forth broad parameters for agencies’ use of scien-
tific advisors and reliance on expert data.179 Despite these positive indi-
cia, it is early in the Obama Administration and the White House has not 
yet had the opportunity to review, and thus consider overriding, nearly 
the number of policies that arise in a full presidential term; it is thus too 
early to issue a final statement on Obama’s predilection for partisanship 
in this regard. 
 
B.  Specificity and Accountability of Policymaking 
 
According to Professors Moynihan and Roberts, “If the Bush ad-
ministration’s strategy of politicization was limited to matters of high 
policy and management, it might have been more defensible. But it was 
not.”180 Some critics of the Bush Administration saw the partisan ap-
proach to governing extend to such bureaucratically remote places as the 
State Department’s Office of the Historian, which, according to one ad-
visory committee member who oversaw the office, was “a reflection of 
the Bush-Cheney Administration. . . . [Y]ou’re either with us or against 
us.”181 The Bush Administration was typically focused on political over-
sight of previously-depoliticized decisions.182
 177. Revocation Of Certain Executive Orders Concerning Regulatory Planning And Review, 
74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the_press_office/ Revo-
cation-Of-Certain-Executive-Orders-Concerning-Regulatory-Planning-And-Review/. This order also 
removed the formal policy review responsibilities that the Bush Administration had given to Vice 
President Cheney in 2002. Id.; see Press Release, OMB Watch Applauds Obama’s Revocation of 
Bush-Era Executive Order on Regulatory Review, OMB Watch, Feb. 4, 2009, available at 
http://www.ombwatch.org/node/9662. 
 178.  See Kagan, supra note 14, at 2317–19. 
 179.  See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Puts His Own Spin on Mix of Science With Politics, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2009; Obama Directive Called “Sea Change” for Scientific Integrity, Science 
Online, http://blogs.sciencemag.org/scienceinsider/2009/03/obama-directive.html (last visited Aug. 
1, 2009). 
 180.  Moynihan & Roberts, supra note 77, at 16. 
 181.  Justin Vogt, The Tweed Wars, NEW YORKER, Jan. 12, 2009. 
 182.  See, e.g., David C. Weiss, The International Boundary Commission, Treaty Interpreta-
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In terms of accountability, Executive Branch secrecy has also been a 
major criticism of the Bush Administration. One commonly cited exam-
ple is the Administration’s willingness to distort or conceal scientific 
evidence that did not support its ideological goals, even when doing so 
seemed unnecessary, even ridiculous.183 One such example is the Bush 
Administration’s refusal to pursue a needle exchange program. The Clin-
ton Administration had made the same decision, acknowledging that the 
social science supported a program but accepting the political fallout by 
rejecting it anyway.184 However, the Bush Administration highlighted 
evidence that it claimed cast doubt on the performance of the program. 
Upon closer inspection, the only researchers who actually opposed nee-
dle exchange were those from a socially conservative organization that 
was unknown to prominent AIDS researchers.185 The group’s application 
for a federal grant had been rated as “not suitable for funding,” but that 
rating was ignored, and the group received a grant and subsequently is-
sued the lone “study” that the White House cited in favor of its needle 
exchange policy.186
For the Obama Administration it is, again, too early to conclude 
whether it is truly inclined to function in a more open, inclusory manner 
than its predecessors. There have, however, been instances that demon-
strate that the Administration places a higher value on transparency than 
its immediate predecessor. For example, on his first day in office, Presi-
dent Obama issued an Open Government Directive to agency heads that 
explained that government must be transparent, participatory, and col-
laborative,187 the types of values that, though vague, are necessary to the 
proper functioning of expert decision making and promote the inclusion 
of scientific input in decision-making processes. The memorandum in-
cluded the command that agency heads work to provide the public with 
“increased opportunities to participate in policymaking,” and indeed 
OMB and the Chief Technology Officer have solicited public participa-
tion through a Google group188 and other web-based participation 
tion, and the President’s Removal Power, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 39, 55–58 (2009) (describing politi-
cization of the International Boundary Commission). 
 183. There are, of course, other examples. One cannot discuss accountability and openness in 
decision making in the Bush Administration without a mention of decision making surrounding de-
tainment and interrogation techniques related to the global war on terror; however, these policies are, 
again, so easily characterized as ideological, as opposed to electorally-focused, and are thus not key 
for my claims in this Article. 
 184.  Editorial, Deadly Ignorance, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 2005 at B06. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187.  Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 23,901, (May 21, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment/. 
 188.  See Open Government Directive, Google Groups, http://groups.google.com/ 
group/opengovernmentdirective?hl=en&pli=1 (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
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mechanisms that groups such as the non-partisan OMB Watch have 
praised.189 Nevertheless, drawing conclusions from such scant evidence 
would be premature and unduly generous to an Administration that has 
only recently encountered the type of declining political support that may 
often lead to a desire for less transparency in decision-making processes. 
Partisans have disagreed, for example, over whether Obama’s appear-
ance at the House Republicans’ retreat or the bipartisan health care 
summit were true efforts at accountability in the health care reform de-
bate or just ploys to drive support for his policies.190 The fact that they 
are occurring at all, however, is a noticeable departure from Obama’s 
predecessor. Yet after the Democrats lost their sixty-seat majority in the 
Senate, Obama conceded that the closed-door nature of health care re-
form deliberations had been a “mistake.”191 And in the wake of the divi-
sive legislative battle over the final bill, Obama installed fifteen nomi-
nees through recess appointments, a move seen by many commentators 
as evidence of the Administration’s increasing willingness to advance 
Obama’s agenda using tactics that Democrats had decried during the 
Bush Administration.192
 
C.  Personnel Management 
 
One of the areas in which the Bush Administration has received the 
harshest criticism for partisanship was in its management of personnel. 
Whether it is Jack Goldsmith’s description of his interview for a position 
at OLC that began with a question about his political campaign contribu-
tions;193 the partisan motivations related to political corruption investiga-
tions of Democrats and voter fraud cases underlying the U.S. attorney 
removals;194 Monica Goodling’s violation of the Hatch Act in consider-
ing Republican campaign contributions in hiring non-political posi-
tions;195 politicization in firing a previously neutral boundary commis-
 189.  Press Release, OMB Watch, OMB Watch Applauds Obama Administration’s Step For-
ward on Open Government (May 22, 2009), available at http://www.ombwatch.org/node/10035. 
 190.  See Posting of Tobin Harshaw to the New York Times Opinionator, Health Care’s Clash 
of the Titans, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/26/health-cares-clash-of-the-titans/ 
(Feb. 26, 2010, 22:10 EST). 
 191.  See Josh Gerstein, President Obama: Lack of Transparency a ‘Mistake’, POLITICO, Jan. 
25, 2010, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0110/31990.html. 
 192. See Posting by John Hudson to The Atlantic Wire, Obama 2.0: Now with 30% More Par-
tisanship, THE ATLANTIC, http://www.theatlanticwire.com/opinions/view/opinion/Obama-20-Now-
with-30-More-Partisanship-3008 (Mar. 28, 2010, 11:27 EST). 
 193.  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 133, at 26. 
 194.  Weiss, supra note 65, at 326, 333 n.105. 
 195.  See Michael Isikoff & Evan Thomas, Bush’s Monica Problem, NEWSWEEK, June 4, 
2007, at 24, 27. 
259] DEFENSE OF THE POST-PARTISAN PRESIDENT 295 
 
sioner charged with maintaining the border with Canada;196 or the ap-
pointment of relatively young, inexperienced officials to posts tradition-
ally reserved for more seasoned officials,197 such criticisms are frequent 
in evaluations of Bush’s presidency. 
As for Obama, despite some commentators’ claims that the selection 
of Rahm Emmanuel as Obama’s Chief of Staff indicated the end of post-
partisanship, on the more rank and file positions, for which the Bush 
Administration was subjected to significant criticism, Obama has worked 
to depoliticize the process. Shortly after entering office Obama issued an 
executive order dealing with Executive Branch employee ethics, a much-
discussed lobbyist gift ban, a statement that employment is based on ex-
perience and qualifications, and an even more important “revolving door 
ban” that requires appointees to commit to not working in the private 
sector on their policy areas for two years after leaving the Executive 
Branch.198 While such reforms are likely to reduce politics in administra-
tion, they are also likely to reduce partisan behaviors because revolving 
door lobbying tends to be a particularly direct way to inject campaign 
and fundraising concerns directly into policymaking. The “K-Street Pro-
ject,” an effort by former House Majority Leader Tom Delay to limit ac-
cess to lobbying firms that hired Democrats is one such example of the 
partisan influence that revolving door hiring has had on federal policy-
making.199
Another interesting contrast between the Bush and Obama Admini-
strations is their efforts to recruit senior senators from the opposite party 
to their respective cabinets. Following Bush’s election and the divisive 
Florida recount, Bush invited John Breaux, the moderate Louisiana De-
mocrat, to serve as energy secretary. Breaux rejected the offer, in part 
because he recognized that Bush’s offer likely was motivated by the fact 
that the Senate was divided fifty-fifty and a Republican governor would 
appoint his replacement.200 Obama attempted a similar, failed courtship 
of New Hampshire Senator Judd Gregg as his Treasury Secretary. Pursu-
ing Gregg was significant because he was a genuine conservative who 
would have been responsible, in a major cabinet post, for advancing 
Obama’s ambitious plans on the economic bailout. However, unlike 
Bush, Obama’s team worked with Democratic New Hampshire Governor 
John Lynch to ensure that he would appoint a Republican caretaker sena-
tor so as not to tip the balance of power in the Senate, as it was possible 
that another Democratic Senator from New Hampshire would have given 
 196.  See Weiss, supra note 182. 
 197.  Strauss, supra note 26, at 736. 
 198. Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Personnel, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 199.  BROWNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 267–70. 
 200.  Id. at 228. 
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Senate Democrats a filibuster-proof majority.201
As for judicial appointments, Bush’s record in confirming Justices 
Roberts and Alito was mostly positive; however, he did encounter sig-
nificant controversy over his appointment of conservative appellate 
judges,202 and he was forced to withdraw the nomination of Harriet 
Miers. Bush also demonstrates why judicial nominations are a less than 
ideal setting to think about partisanship. On the one hand, it is easy to 
characterize Bush’s nominations as bipartisan since both of the nominees 
he sent to the Senate were confirmed. On the other hand, excepting Cla-
rence Thomas who was confirmed narrowly because of personal scandal, 
both of Bush’s nominees were confirmed by narrower margins than any 
confirmed justices since at least before the Nixon Administration.203 
Bush seemed to follow Tom Delay’s vote counting theory that “anything 
less” than “razor-thin party-line votes” meant that he had “conceded too 
much to those resisting the conservative agenda.”204 The Miers nomina-
tion also brings out the problems of characterization. To some, the key 
problem with Miers was that the appointment was political cronyism, a 
concern related to partisanship.205 But, in the end, it may well have been 
conservative opposition stemming from the lack of a track record that 
doomed Miers’ candidacy. Obama initially received mostly praise for his 
first appellate nomination, moderate David Hamilton to the Seventh Cir-
cuit.206 While the ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
Jeff Sessions, attempted to orchestrate a filibuster, Hamilton was eventu-
ally confirmed and the nomination was seen as many as an example of 
“good practices” in appointing Judge Hamilton by, for example, consult-
ing with Hamilton’s home state senators and finding a nominee who re-
ceived the highest American Bar Association rating and was also praised 
by the local chapter of the Federalist Society.207 In an even higher profile 
 201.  See, Posting of Marc Ambinder to The Atlantic Politics Channel, 
http://politics.theatlantic.com/2009/02/lynch_will_appoint_republican_if_obama_nominates_gregg.p
hp (Feb. 2, 2009, 14:30 EST). At the time of Gregg’s nomination, the winner of the Minnesota Sen-
ate race, which Democrat Al Franken would eventually win giving the Democrats sixty seats in the 
Senate, was still unclear. See Jay Weiner, Senate Recount: After Unanimous Ruling for Franken, 
Attention Shifts to Pawlenty – and Coleman, MINN. POST, June 30, 2009. 
 202.  See, e.g., Helen Dewar & Mike Allen, GOP May Target Use of Filibuster, WASH. POST., 
Dec. 13, 2004, at A1. 
 203.  See Wayne Sulfridge, Ideology as a Factor in Senate Consideration of Supreme Court 
Nominations, 42 J. OF POL. 560, 563 (1980). 
 204.  BROWNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 3. 
 205.  Adam Bellow, Dealing in Dynasties, NAT. REV. ONLINE, Oct. 18, 2005. 
 206.  See Press Release, Office of Senator Richard Lugar, Lugar Introduction Statement for 
Judge David Hamilton, (Apr. 1, 2009), http://lugar.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=310927; Neil A. 
Lewis, Moderate Is Said to Be Pick for Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009 (“Judge Hamilton . . . is 
said by [Indiana] lawyers to represent some of his state’s traditionally moderate strain.”). But see 
Judicial Confirmation Network, Hearings Continue on Controversial Judge, 
http://judicialnetwork.com/news/hearings-continue-controversial-judge (last visited Jan. 26, 2010). 
 207.  Carl Tobias, Ending ‘Confirmation Wars’, BALT. SUN, Nov. 30, 2009, available at 
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nomination, Justice Sotomayor was confirmed on a 68-31 vote, a margin 
similar to Chief Justice Roberts and wider than Justice Alito, though she 
notably attracted less bipartisan support than pre-Bush Supreme Court 
nominees.208 Excepting the immediate reception to the appointment of 
Berkeley Law professor Goodwin Liu, Obama’s other federal judicial 
nominees have not yet encountered the resistance of those Bush ap-
pointed, though Obama has moved more slowly in appointing judges 
than did his predecessor.209 Finally, Professors David Fontana and Micah 
Schwartzman have noted that the average age of Obama’s first batch of 
circuit court nominee is older than those appointed by George W. Bush, 
Clinton, George H. W. Bush, and Reagan, an indication, they find, that 
Obama is less focused on appointing younger, more ideological candi-
dates to the circuit courts.210
 
D.  Election Related Policies 
 
“Election administration is another policy area where the Bush ad-
ministration has ignored evidence and the advice of career staff,” accord-
ing to Professors Moynihan and Roberts.211 “In this case,” they argue, 
“the policy goal closely coincides with partisan advantage.”212 A Repub-
lican volunteer from the 2000 Florida recount, for example, was charged 
with heading a voting rights unit at the DOJ and subsequently overturned 
career staff guidance, later upheld in court, that was viewed as disadvan-
tageous to Republicans.213 Political appointees at the Election Assistance 
Commission altered the findings in a report it had commissioned on vot-
er fraud, changing the professional researchers’ view from “there is 
widespread but not unanimous agreement that there is little polling place 
fraud,” to “there is a great deal of debate on the pervasiveness of 
fraud.”214 Other examples of facially partisan behavior relating to elec-
tions are prevalent throughout the Bush Administration. For example, 
during President Bush’s reelection campaign, then National Security Ad-
visor Condoleezza Rice came under significant criticism for her public 
engagements that many saw as open campaigning. Whereas during Oc-
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bal-op.confirmation30nov30,0,2535556.story. 
 208.  Paul Kane and Amy Goldstein, Senate Confirms Sonia Sotomayor for Supreme Court, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2009. 
 209. Jeffrey Toobin, One Year: Where Are the Judges, NEW YORKER, Jan. 10, 2010. 
 210.  See David Fontana and Micah Schwartzman, Old World, THE NEW REPUB., July 17, 
2009, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/old-world. 
 211.  Moynihan & Roberts, supra note 77, at 16–17 (citing Kaufman, supra note 99, at 1060). 
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 213. Id. 
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tober and November of 2001, 2002, and 2003 she had made three public 
appearances combined (two in New York and one in Chicago), in Octo-
ber and November of 2004 she made at least one public appearance in 
Oregon, Washington, North Carolina, Michigan and Florida, and at least 
two appearances in the battleground states of Pennsylvania and Ohio.215 
Despite the truism that whether something is partisan is often a matter of 
characterization,216 it is equally true that such electorally-focused behav-
ior is pretext and simply cannot pass the plausible deniability test. 
For this metric it is simply too early to judge the Obama Administra-
tion as it has yet to be in office during a federal election. It is at least 
concerning that conservatives have criticized the Obama DOJ’s handling 
of a voter intimidation claim in Philadelphia that career staff was pursu-
ing.217 However, such claims are likely minor compared to those arising 
out of the U.S. attorney firings for example,218 and a verdict on this met-
ric of partisanship for the Obama Administration will have to wait until 
at least November 2010. 
 
E.  Relationship Building 
 
Interestingly, it is on this metric more than perhaps any other that 
George W. Bush stands more isolated from his presidential predecessors. 
One of Bush’s advisors has lamented the former-President’s lack of so-
cial outreach in Washington: “We have no social presidency,” said the 
advisor. “We don’t use the White House, we don’t use Camp David, we 
don’t use Air Force One, we don’t use all the symbolism of the presi-
dency to build community and connection with people on the opposite 
side, so when it comes time to talk the issues we would have relation-
ships. We have none of that.”219 Bush was rumored to dislike cocktail 
parties, having given up drinking years earlier following his admitted al-
cohol abuse and drunken driving arrest.220 Though he viewed his rejec-
tion of the Washington social scene as a badge of honor, there is no ques-
tion that he socialized less in the White House than any President in 
recent memory. 
President Obama, on the other hand, seemed to begin his presidency 
by moving in a different direction, though this good will was quickly lost 
as major disagreements brewed on the 2009 financial bailout and health 
 215.  Posting by John Nichols to The Beat blog, A Politician, Not a Diplomat, THE NATION, 
http://www.thenation.com/blogs/thebeat/2012/a_politician_not_a_diplomat (Nov. 17, 2004, 13:17 
EST). 
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 218.  See supra text and accompanying note 194. 
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 220.  See McGevna supra note 159. 
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care reform. The President initially received significant press for reinstat-
ing the kind of social events and after-hours get-togethers not seen at the 
White House in nearly a decade. First there was a cocktail party at the 
White House for a group of bipartisan legislators. Obama followed this 
up in February with a Super Bowl party that brought Democratic and 
Republican members of Congress to the White House. The First Family 
also hosted a concert by Stevie Wonder, which was attended by members 
of Congress from both parties. On attending the Super Bowl party, con-
servative Republican Congressman Trent Frank remarked that he is 
“probably as philosophically opposed to this president as any member of 
Congress.”221 However, Franks said that he left the party with a new-
found respect for Obama: “First of all, when you have a meeting like 
this, it humanizes and personalizes opponents, where you recognize them 
as human beings.”222 Said Franks, “I think that does a lot towards help-
ing people put aside politics and really try to do what is best for the 
country.”223 Capitalizing on the success of these events, the President has 
determined to hold weekly Wednesday cocktail parties at the White 
House and has held a “time out dinner” with members of both parties. 
One analyst from the Brookings Institution noted that by late-April 2009, 
Obama had held personal meetings with more members of Congress than 
Bush did in his entire presidency.224 Yet by early 2010 the major policy 
disputes had poisoned this good will. At least one member of the House 
was calling Obama “the most partisan President that America has ever 
seen.”225 Thus, as of early 2010, despite any efforts Obama has spent on 
relationship building—and I claim the efforts do matter for post-
partisanship—the results have not followed, and Obama has seen his re-
lationships with members of Congress worsen significantly. 
In concluding this admittedly brief application of the metrics of par-
tisanship, I emphatically do not claim that these metrics can be mechani-
cally applied, producing a dispositive answer as to whether an Admini-
stration is either partisan or not. Nor do I assert that the argument 
allowed by this brief space is an all-encompassing catalog with rigorous 
social science method. I do, however, argue that the metrics are useful to 
conceptually break down the question into the above component pieces 
that frequently arise both in commentators’ discussions and in the his-
torical record of media and congressional criticism. Applying that 
 221.  See Jeff Zeleny, Obama Woos G.O.P. With Attention, and Cookies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/05/us/politics/04web-zeleny.html. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224.  The Senator-in-Chief, ECONOMIST, June 27, 2009, at 40. 
 225. Shiner, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. (quoting Representative Candice 
Miller). 
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framework to the Bush Administration, I can see no credible response to 
the claim that the Bush Administration was the most partisan in the pe-
riod under discussion—as far back as through the Nixon Administration. 
On almost every metric, the Bush Administration faced prominent and 
significant criticism for working not just for ideological goals but for 
pure party advantage. There are enough instances of this behavior that 
asserting an unprecedented record of partisanship as compared to recent 
administrations is neither manipulation nor cherry picking. This conclu-
sion seems particularly justified given that the Bush Administration had a 
Republican Congress for six of the eight years it was in office and a me-
dia that is generally considered to have become relatively docile for a 
number of years in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks. 
Furthermore, though I have taken a different route, I am hardly the 
first to reach this conclusion. Both legal and political science academics 
have argued this conclusion, as have those in the popular media, and, fi-
nally, politicians, political operatives, and policy staff have stated the 
same.226 The Economist was likely the most direct in its assessment, stat-
ing that the result of the Administration’s policies could be seen in “the 
three most notable characteristics of the Bush presidency: partisanship, 
politicization and incompetence. Mr. Bush was the most partisan presi-
dent in living memory.”227 The public also reflected this view that the 
Bush Administration was unusually partisan. Tellingly, at its worst, 
Bush’s approval rating among Democrats fell lower than Nixon’s ratings 
among Democrats at the peak of Watergate; Carter’s showing among 
Republicans at his lowest point of his presidency; or Clinton’s rating by 
Republicans during the height of his impeachment.228
As for the Obama Administration, my essential claim—as evidenced 
by the relatively scant discussion above—is that it is simply too early to 
take accurate stock of its degree of partisanship. So far, however, there 
are signs that Obama is retreating to pre-Bush levels of partisanship, per-
haps to make good on his post-partisan pledge.229 Again, the partisanship 
of the Obama Administration returns to my ends-means discussion 
above. On the metrics of partisanship I have developed, which are large-
 226.  See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 133; Skinner, supra note 7, at 605 (“George W. Bush 
has brought this partisanship to a new extreme—perhaps to the point when practice becomes pathol-
ogy.”); Editorial, Politics, Pure and Cynical, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at A22; Skinner, supra 
note 7. Rush Limbaugh has taken what appears to be the minority position, arguing that Bush “had a 
reverence for the office, that’s why he didn’t get partisan.” Limbaugh: Bush Wasn’t Partisan, Think-
Progress.org, http://thinkprogress.org/2009/02/02/limbaugh-bush-hated/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
 227.  The Frat Boy Ships Out, supra note 7. 
 228.  BROWNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 309. 
 229.  See supra notes and accompanying text 176–178, 187–189, 200–210, 219–222. See also 
John Harwood, ‘Partisan’ Seeks a Prefix: Bi- or Post-, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2008 “Obama is doing 
something marvelously right,” Michael Gerson, President Bush’s onetime senior speechwriter, wrote 
in The Washington Post. “He is disappointing the ideologues.” Id. 
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ly about means and process, Obama seems to be less partisan than his 
predecessor. However, because of the large-scale policy challenges he 
has taken on, the ends have been unquestionably divisive. 
In one sense, regardless of how partisan Obama wanted to be, having 
had less than two years to generate scandals, and lacking an election cy-
cle in which to deploy partisan tactics, it would be almost impossible for 
the new Administration to appear partisan in comparison to its predeces-
sors. However, even given this short temporal period, there are clear in-
dications—reliance on expertise, increased transparency, lobbying bans, 
de-centralization of administrative policy-making, and bipartisan rela-
tionship building, to name a few—that the Obama Administration is 
seeking a less partisan approach than the previous Administration, per-
haps following its concept of post-partisanship. Many observers have 
welcomed this potentially post-partisan approach; however, there are, of 
course, detractors. Representative Barney Frank has stated that Obama 
“overestimates” his ability to “charm” the Right into agreeing with him; 
Frank joked that this collegiality was leading him to suffer from a “post-
partisan depression.”230
 
III.  DEFINING POST-PARTISANSHIP AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF A POST-
PARTISAN PRESIDENCY 
 
Even if it is too early to render judgments about the Obama Admini-
stration, it is important to begin the discussion because of how President 
Obama has positioned himself. Indeed, a key goal of this Article is to ad-
dress post-partisanship, a phrase that the President’s political team, cam-
paign advisors, and the media use to describe his approach to politics. 
Given the length of time left for the Obama Administration, it is more 
useful to discuss what post-partisanship can and cannot be and what les-
sons it counsels for his Administration than to simply assess the political 
or partisan nature of his performance thus far. This final part engages in 
this discussion, arguing for an understanding of post-partisanship that is 
more limited and pragmatic than bipartisanship, as well as a natural reac-
tion to the partisanship of the Bush Administration. It then explains that a 
claim to post-partisanship is a logical, welcome, and pragmatically useful 
position given the previous Administration. Finally, it explains that post-
partisanship, as this Article understands it, is well-suited for the current 
political climate, which is characterized by unusually divided parties that 
are each more ideologically coherent within themselves than at almost 
any time in American history. This discussion also engages normative 
 230. See Ryan Grim, Barney Frank Has Post-Partisan Depression, POLITICO, Dec. 22, 2008, 
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implications of post-partisanship and includes some advice for the 
Obama Administration regarding the proper role of politics in a post-
partisan Administration. 
 
A.  Defining Post-Partisanship 
 
The explanations for what it means to be post-partisan are almost as 
varied as the commentators that have weighed in on the issue. Some have 
argued that the post-partisan rhetoric is a strategy meant to capture the 
so-called Millennial Generation, which is less likely to identify with a 
particular party.231 Others have looked at Obama’s past as a community 
organizer in Chicago and claimed that post-partisanship is about return-
ing to a strong inclusion of community values in politics.232 On many 
commentators’ understanding, post-partisanship is conflated with biparti-
sanship and is simply implementing policies that both parties support.233 
As Democratic operative Al From has usefully explained, “Post-partisan 
solutions transcend partisan orthodoxy. They put the national interest 
above party interests.”234 Clearly there is disagreement. One frustrated 
commentator opined that, “like everyone else, I’m left wondering just 
what post-partisanship means to Barack Obama and how it could possi-
bly work as long as the Republican Party has enough votes to stop a De-
mocratic president from enacting his or her ideas.”235
I argue that the best understanding of what it means to be post-
partisan arises from the metrics of partisanship described above. The ar-
gument is thus somewhat similar to From’s in that post-partisanship is 
characterized by the fact that party-based electoral advantage takes a 
back seat to national policy concerns.236 Post-partisanship is, however, 
not about removing all politics from governing, nor is it about passing 
legislation by broad bipartisan margins. President Obama has associated 
party-based partisanship with a kind of cynicism in politics.237 Being 
post-partisan is taking action and implementing decision-making policies 
 231. Eric Greenberg, Obama and the Post-Partisan Vote, THE HUFFINGTON POST, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-greenberg/obama-and-the-post-partis_b_162314.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 29, 2010). 
 232. Dan Conley, Look homeward, Obama, SALON.COM, http://www.salon.com/ opin-
ion/feature/2008/05/23/obama/index.html (last visited Jan 29, 2010). 
 233. See, e.g., Mort Kondracke, ‘Post-Partisanship’ Isn’t Dead Yet—But It’s Very Close, 
ROLL CALL, Mar. 19, 2009; see also Op-Ed, Karl Rove, The President Has Become a Divisive Fig-
ure, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2009. 
 234. Editorial, Obama’s Post-Partisanship, PHIL. INQUIRER, Mar. 15, 2009. 
 235. Conley, supra note 232. 
 236. These policy priorities, of course, are still created largely within the party structure, but 
as explained throughout this Article, my undertanding of post-partisanship does not require remov-
ing the party apparatus from policymaking. 
 237. See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 8, 131, 214 (2006). 
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that counter that party-based cynicism. Making personnel decisions 
based primarily on qualifications; listening to science and expertise in-
stead of overriding it with political concerns; appointing judges and jus-
tices that do not incite partisan firestorms or result in narrow confirma-
tions; refraining from politically motivated prosecutions; working to 
build extra-political relationships across parties—these are all examples 
of behaviors which involve politics but which can be seen as post-
partisan.238 These behaviors are limited in that they do not embrace truly 
broad bipartisanship; however, they are nonetheless important. As one 
Capitol Hill commentator noted, post-partisanship “aspires to a politics 
of unity and respect.”239 In his book on partisanship in American gov-
ernment, Ronald Brownstein argued that while it “may have been unreal-
istic for any President (short of a Lincoln) to entirely tame the forces di-
viding America” during the late 1960s and early 1970s, “Americans had 
a right to expect that their president would not deepen and widen those 
divisions,” often for mere electoral gain.240 Brownstein’s claim gets to 
the core of the value of post-partisanship. Under post-partisanship, par-
ties and elections are not the primary drivers of policy; they do not do-
minate rationality and professionalism. 
An important corollary to this understanding of post-partisanship is 
that such a conception is not the same as being bipartisan. Many of the 
critics of President Obama since he has taken office have focused on the 
way in which the stimulus bill and health care reform legislation were 
passed without a single Republican vote, holding out such a perceived 
failure as the President reneging on his post-partisan promises.241 In 
March 2009, for example, columnist Mort Kondracke chided, “It’s time 
for Obama to remember all those ‘post-partisan’ campaign promises of 
his and find ways to listen to Republicans and accommodate some of 
 238.  It may, of course, be true that some Executive Branch actions will result in a political 
firestorm despite the goodwill of a White House’s actions, the qualifications of the candidate, or the 
merits of the policy. This is why looking at a single example of an action or decision, in isolation, is 
not particularly insightful. It is also why one must follow Professors Pildes’ and Levinsons’ advice 
and analyze macro political and legal issues from the perspective of whether government is unified 
or divided based. See Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9. However, the fact that the value of informa-
tion from an isolated incident is limited is also precisely why it is necessary to develop a number of 
metrics to roughly measure Executive Branch behavior over a period of years and in comparison to 
other administrations. Thanks to Patrick Luff for raising this point. 
 239.  Brent Budowsky, The Post-Partisan Reallignment, THE HILL, Oct. 21, 2008, 
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post-partisan-pledges-obama-enters-campaign-mode-sell-stimulus/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2010); Ste-
ven Lee, Obama’s promise of post-partisanship, THE NEW REPUBLICANS, Apr. 9, 2009, 
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their ideas.”242 Kondracke went on to explain how the President should 
hold more closed-door strategy sessions with top Republicans and adopt 
policy ideas that Kondracke and other Republicans find favorable, imply-
ing that anything short of this failed Obama’s post-partisan pledge.243 In 
June 2009, Senator John McCain criticized Obama’s approach to biparti-
san consensus, deriding Obama’s strategy of getting a few key Republi-
can votes rather than building wide legislative margins from both par-
ties.244 Post-partisanship, as I argue for it to be understood, does not 
require building broad legislative support from both parties; it just re-
quires a less cynical brand of politics focused on rationality and expertise 
in decision making, accountability to the public, not using public office 
for party advantage, and working to build cross-party relationships. The 
Obama Administration essentially agrees as it “insists that being a post-
partisan is not the same thing as being a centrist on all issues or meeting 
opponents halfway every time.”245 Indeed, according to William Safire, 
“The adjective partisan means ‘strongly committed to an ideology or par-
ty.’ Bipartisan means ‘cooperation between two parties to achieve a po-
litical goal’; nonpartisan means ‘cooperation in pursuance of patriotic, 
civic or philanthropic goals.’”246 Thus, there is political space for a form 
of post-partisanship that is not complete cooperation but is, instead, char-
acterized by a standing-down from the partisan warfare of the previous 
administrations. On this understanding, post-partisanship is a more mod-
est—though still important—goal and, those who have criticized the 
Obama Administration for not following through on post-partisan 
pledges are misguided. 
The type of post-partisanship argued for above, even though more 
limited than traditional bipartisanship, is an important development and 
Executive Branch governance strategy, particularly when situated as a 
response to the extreme partisan behaviors seen in the Bush Administra-
tion. Indeed, some commentators predicted the idea of post-partisanship, 
though they did not describe it by that name. Writing in early 2007, when 
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most observers considered Obama a long shot to even receive the De-
mocratic nomination, author Ronald Brownstein presciently predicted the 
following: 
 
One of the most venerable theories about presidential elections is that 
the nation almost always elects a president who responds to the flaws it 
finds in his predecessor. John F. Kennedy was more vibrant and ener-
getic than Eisenhower; Carter more honest than Nixon; Reagan tougher 
than Carter; George H.W. Bush “kinder and gentler” than Reagan; 
Clinton more engaged and energetic than Bush; the second Bush more 
morally upright in his personal life than Clinton. If that pattern holds, 
Americans in 2008 will be searching for two things above all in the 
successor to George W. Bush: competence in the management of gov-
ernment’s day-to-day challenges, and the creativity and flexibility to 
construct more consensus at home and around the world.247
 
These concerns could be restated as a desire for expertise and ac-
countability in administration and personnel management, as well as a 
desire for a willingness to remain open to bipartisan personnel and poli-
cies. Brownstein was not alone. Even before Obama’s nomination, 
George W. Bush’s chief pollster noted that “an election could come 
along that all of a sudden is not a close election if somebody or some 
party speaks to the . . . group while still maintaining part of their par-
ty. . . . I think people in this country want something that brings them to-
gether, not something that separates them.”248 Indeed, at least one popu-
lar commentator has already questioned whether Obama has moved too 
far in the direction of post-partisanship, overreacting to the perceived de-
ficiencies of the Bush and Clinton Administrations in terms of partisan 
action and decision making.249 
 
B.  Implications of a Post-Partisan Presidency 
 
A common criticism of the idea of being post-partisan is that the 
concept embodies no new insight, that it is essentially no different from 
previous promises of bipartisanship; however, there are reasons why the 
current appearance of post-partisanship is particularly important. Long-
time political analyst Norman Ornstein was prepared to be skeptical of 
the post-partisan pledge, reminding that before Obama, “[t]here was Ri-
chard Nixon, whose slogan was ‘bring us together.’ Gerald Ford prom-
 247. See BROWNSTEIN, supra note 47, at 415. 
 248. Id. at 24. 
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ised an era of ‘compromise, conciliation and cooperation.’ George H.W. 
Bush was ‘kinder and gentler,’ and George W. Bush wanted to ‘change 
the tone.’”250 What makes the idea of being “post-partisan” any differ-
ent? First, given the changes in political dynamics in the last decade or 
so, there is an important role for post-partisan behavior as herein defined. 
Second, as explained above, less partisanship is characterized by fewer 
instances within a given administration of the metrics of partisanship. 
Thus, if an administration is committed to post-partisanship, I argue be-
low that such action should have—beyond generally positive conse-
quences of increased likelihood of bipartisan cooperation—policy les-
sons for how we understand the presidency and the way in which the 
Obama Administration should behave in fulfilling its post-partisan 
pledge.251 In addition, post-partisanship has legal implications for the 
following: the accountability justification for executive power, modern 
separation of powers doctrine, and the proper judicial deference to Ex-
ecutive Branch decision making. 
 
1.  The “why now?” of post-partisanship 
 
To begin, it is important to understand the political space in which 
post-partisanship is useful given the current dynamics and recent history 
of American politics. A widely recognized realignment, or sorting, of 
American political parties and ideologies in recent years makes post-
partisanship particularly relevant and renders its contributions more im-
portant than they would have been a generation ago. This shift over time 
is one reason why Obama’s positioning is different and more meaningful 
than previous pledges of moving beyond party differences. In addition, 
there are more self-described independents than at any time since at least 
the beginning of the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt.252 Thus, despite 
Norman Ornstein’s skepticism, he did concede that he was encouraged 
by Obama, pointing out that “[w]e are actually seeing — for the first 
time in a long time — some actions that may or may not lead to a differ-
ent kind of partisan dynamic in Washington.”253
To the extent that the Obama Administration is serious about creat-
ing this different dynamic, it should be aware of the types of action and 
decision making, discussed above,254 into which partisan behavior can 
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creep. Though the Administration need not build the broad, bipartisan 
consensus that Senator McCain and Mort Kondracke have called for—
and, indeed, the Administration’s policies have indicated it is willing to 
forego such support—the White House must continue to be sure that 
when it goes alone, as Democrats, its decisions are based on applying 
ideology to expertise and consistent process rather than promoting an 
agenda based entirely on cynical electoral advantage. Given the current 
state of Congress and American political parties, this may be more diffi-
cult than it at first seems. 
Political scientists, popular writers, and, more recently, legal com-
mentators have extensively discussed the effect of ideological and party 
alignment on American politics since the 1990s and how structural 
changes have resulted in increasing partisanship. A bare bones sketch of 
the argument, which I will call the “sorting account,” goes as follows: 
From the Civil War through the Civil Rights Movement, the political 
ideologies of conservative versus liberal did not neatly correlate with 
whether a voter or politician was a Republican or Democrat. The long-
standing backlash against Abraham Lincoln and the Republican Party 
ensured party loyalty—Yellow Dog Democrats—and in many places, 
such as the Northeast, a then-broader Republican Party included moder-
ates and even liberals. In Congress, legislation often could not move 
without bipartisan support because of these regional differences that 
were as important as party differences. As the stigma gradually wore off 
Republicanism in the South; as Democrats supported the Civil Rights 
Movement; and as increasingly gerrymandered congressional districts 
and progressively tighter rules of internal congressional control pushed 
members to political extremes to win primaries and caucus promotions, 
party became more predictive of political ideology than at any time in 
recent American history.255 The result of this sorting is two political par-
ties that are more internally coherent and polarized from each other than 
at any time in at least 150 years.256 So whereas Nixon, Carter, Reagan, 
Bush I, and even Clinton had to reach across the aisle because of genu-
inely conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans within their own re-
spective parties, Presidents George W. Bush and Obama were not in a 
position that required bipartisan cooperation when holding party majori-
ties in Congress. They had and have the authority to drive through policy 
without so much as even a nod to the other party. Professors Levinson 
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and Pildes have argued that faced with “an era of cohesive and polarized 
parties” it is essential that courts and constitutional scholars consider 
“legislative activism and extremism”—and I would add Executive 
Branch action—against this partisan backdrop.257
In addition, Professor Richard Skinner has argued that beginning in 
1980 Ronald Reagan began the era of the partisan presidency. As Skin-
ner persuasively argues, the presidencies since 1980 are distinct from 
those previous.258 The recent administrations, he claims, are character-
ized by a President that presents a more partisan image to the country, 
focuses more than previous presidents on consolidating administrative 
control, projects his message through niche media and partisan press, 
campaigns extensively and works with his party’s committee more 
closely than ever before, and increasingly works with campaign opera-
tives, think tanks, and consultancies.259 Skinner’s view is not contrary to 
the sorting account of American politics expressed above; rather, it is a 
particularly strong expression of it and an explanation that the result of 
this sorting is an increasingly partisan presidency. 
Thus, under both the sorting account as well as Skinner’s compli-
mentary view, George W. Bush’s partisanship may not have been the re-
sult only of his or his staff’s strategy and tactics. Bush’s partisanship 
may have also been a reaction to the fact that he governed in one of the 
only times in the last fifty years in which the same party controlled the 
White House and the Congress, and that controlling Congress meant hav-
ing an ideological majority as well as a party majority. In addition, fol-
lowing Skinner’s approach, Bush merely continued kicking the ball of 
the partisan presidency down the road.260 Perhaps, until structural de-
vices and judicial attitudes catch up with the key insight of Professors 
Levinson and Pildes—that whether government is unified or divided is as 
important as branch-based separation of powers—we can only hope that 
a President and his advisors in a unified government recognize the ease 
with which cynical partisanship can creep into politics and policymaking. 
To career campaign operatives that inevitably end up in an administra-
tion’s higher reaches, unified government must seem to put the idea of a 
permanent governing majority within reach. 
If these accounts are accurate then we might expect the Obama Ad-
ministration to follow Bush’s partisan lead given the lack of structural 
constraints. While public choice theorists would likely reject Executive 
Branch officials’ ability to refrain from partisanization, those in the 
Obama Administration should look at the partisanship of the previous 
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Administration and be acutely aware of overreaching. Put differently, 
this is one of the key political spaces in which post-partisanship adds 
value. Being post-partisan can serve as a self-moderating philosophy of 
inclusion when, for the first time in generations, political circumstance 
does not dictate cooperation by necessity. By positioning himself as post-
partisan, President Obama sends important signals to his White House 
staff and agency heads and also stakes a challenge for himself against 
which the public can judge him. I argue that our judgment should be 
made based on the considerations that make up the metrics of partisan-
ship discussed above. Perhaps creating such expectations ex ante more 
adequately aligns incentives for Administration officials to then follow 
them. 
 
2.  Post-partisanship’s constitutional and administrative ramifications 
 
In addition to guiding the Executive Branch’s actions and decision-
making processes, post-partisanship can do substantive legal work. As-
pects of accountability, independence, and democracy are foundational to 
doctrines in constitutional and administrative law, and it is in these areas 
that post-partisanship is important for legal analysis. 
A post-partisan President serves to legitimize the theory of account-
ability—the “trump card” according to Martin Flaherty261—that under-
lies constitutional law arguments regarding the proper scope of executive 
power. As Professor Heidi Kitrosser has explained, “Underlying all 
forms of accountability is the need for transparency and procedural regu-
larity sufficient to enable public and inter-branch assessment of—and re-
sponses to—government actions.”262 In other words, the types of open-
ness and expertise-based decision making discussed above as metrics of 
partisanship do not only relate to how we characterize an administra-
tion’s actions; such values relate to how those actions conform with the 
constitutional plan. To the extent that an administration acts in a particu-
larly partisan way, especially as to the metric of specificity and account-
ability of policymaking, such actions undermine the legitimacy of execu-
tive unitariness.263 In the other direction, the more an administration acts 
in a post-partisan manner, the more we should be comfortable with more 
centralized Executive Branch control.264
 261. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1824 (1996). 
 262. Heidi Kitrosser, Accountability and Administrative Structure, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
607, 610 (2009). 
 263. See Calabresi, supra note 33 (justifying normative claims for a unitary executive on the 
benefits of increased accountability). 
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Conceptualizing the degree to which a President acts in a partisan, 
party-based manner also has implications for separation of powers. Pro-
fessors Pildes and Levinson have discussed the importance of parties and 
unified or divided government to the actual existence of the structural 
checks that Madison envisioned existing among branches, explaining 
that parties actually serve the checking function that Madison saw for 
branches: “From the Madisonian perspective that undergirds much of 
constitutional law and theory . . . the primary threat posed by political 
parties to the separation of powers comes not from party division of gov-
ernment but from party unification.”265 Under this view, “Madisonians in 
a modern democracy must count on party division to recreate a competi-
tive dynamic between the branches. And far from encouraging unified 
party control of the House, Senate, and presidency, Madisonians will 
view the prospect of unchecked and unbalanced governance by a cohe-
sive majority party as cause for constitutional alarm.”266 It follows from 
such a conception of separation of powers that the party-based problem 
that worries Professors Pildes and Levinson is exacerbated if the Execu-
tive Branch is acting with purposefully partisan ends or conducting busi-
ness with objectively partisan means. Such behavior, by itself, is unlikely 
to cause constitutional alarm, but when combined with partisan behavior 
from the same party in Congress, the potential for the Madisonian checks 
to operate as planned dims more completely. To the extent that commen-
tators and policymakers now think about separation of powers from a 
party-conscious perspective, they should also consider the degree of par-
tisanship that an Administration demonstrates in its actions. An admini-
stration that acts in a post-partisan manner strengthens the types of 
checks that Madison envisioned and the kind of actual, party-based 
checks that Pildes and Levinson see today. 
Finally, the demonstration of the possibility of pure partisanship 
raises questions about the proper scope of judicial deference to Executive 
Branch decision making. As Lisa Schultz Bressman has forcefully ar-
gued, one reading of the important administrative law deference issues in 
Brown & Williamson and Gonzales v. Oregon, for example, is that the 
Supreme Court was finding that in the Executive Branch’s request for 
deference no amount of political accountability was sufficient to over-
come the Executive’s obligation to “function as a part of the larger gov-
ernment” and to “serve the public, especially when addressing significant 
social issues.”267 Under this compelling view, the Executive Branch, she 
says, “is not entitled to deference when taking positions that, though po-
resembling a courtroom flush with political influence rather than law.”). 
 265. Levinson & Pildes, supra note 9, at 17. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Bressman, supra note 37, at 780. 
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litically expedient, disregard Congress’s views and the engagement of 
the people. To do so raises an inference that the administration is inter-
ested in representing only some of the people, not all of the people.”268 
Seen through Professor Schultz Bressman’s democracy-centric view, the 
question of when the Executive Branch is taking such expedient views at 
Congress’s and the public’s detriment is a question of when the Execu-
tive Branch begins to abandon typical politics and engage in pure parti-
sanship. A dedication to post-partisanship, on this view, should restore 
legitimacy to the Executive Branch and buttress the reasoning underlying 
key cases discussing deference in administrative law.269
Such deference issues inherently relate to one of the metrics dis-
cussed above: the respect given to expertise. For example, Jody Freeman 
and Adrian Vermeule have argued that Massachusetts v. EPA, the so-
called “global warming case,” can best be understood as a continuation 
of Gonzales v. Oregon and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a line of cases in which 
Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy “joined forces to override executive 
positions that they found untrustworthy, in the sense that executive ex-
pertise had been subordinated to politics.”270 They claim that this “exper-
tise forcing” was the Court’s solution to the EPA’s refusal to exercise its 
discretion to assess whether greenhouse gases “cause or contribute to, air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public wel-
fare.”271 This “decision,” made while facing pressure from the White 
House not to regulate carbon dioxide emissions and to uphold the essen-
tially untenable position that greenhouse gases have no adverse effects 
on public health and welfare, counseled the Court—Freeman and Ver-
meule claim—in ruling against the EPA, resulting in less than usual 
Chevron deference.272 In other words, decision making that looks parti-
san has led the Court to suggest that deference may not be afforded for 
these party-based decisions and has instead required a decision grounded 
in administrative expertise. This occurred increasingly toward the end of 
the Bush Administration.273 Given that the Court’s rulings on policies of 
the handling of suspected terrorists and global warming became a major 
detriment to Executive Branch political objectives, there was significant 
cost for the Bush Administration’s partisanship. Thus, a further potential 
 268. Id. at 798. 
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benefit to the Obama Administration for adhering to post-partisan prom-
ises may be the self-serving benefit of more deferential judicial review of 
agency decisions. Indeed, limiting deference based on the degree of par-
tisan behavior that characterized Executive Branch action may create the 
additional incentives that public choice theorists would argue are needed 
for a White House to embrace post-partisanship. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
An article of this length cannot hope to describe all of the facets or 
historical examples of differentiating the high politics of typical political 
choice from the low politics of cynical partisan advantage. It can, how-
ever, mark the beginning of a more detailed analysis of the differences 
between partisan, political, and mixed motive decisions and apply those 
differences to a theory of post-partisanship that is grounded in moving 
away from the Bush Administration’s decision making with its frequent 
focus on electoral advantage. In doing so, I have established metrics of 
partisan behavior, and I argued that the post-partisanship practiced thus 
far by the Obama Administration is not the broad bipartisan consensus 
building for which some commentators had hoped. However, it need not 
be. Given the historically unique ideological division between the present 
Republican and Democratic parties, a post-partisanship that rejects think-
ing about public policy, personnel decisions, and internal process in a 
highly partisan, electorally-focused way is a moderating force on na-
tional politics that returns an element of civility to public life. In addi-
tion, post-partisanship buttresses values of accountability and democracy 
that relate to Executive Branch legitimacy, which, in turn, is a foundation 
of important doctrines in constitutional and administrative law. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly from the perspective of democracy, the 
post-partisanship that the Obama Administration appears inclined to 
practice is exactly the type of force for which many Americans were 
hoping when they cast their ballots in November 2008. 
 
